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ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the controversy over using historical evi-
dence to interpret the law, both in legal practice and in scholarship.  
I argue that instead of requiring lawyers to wholly incorporate the 
professional standards of academic historiography, the most likely 
way (as a practical matter) to increase the quality of “lawyers’ history” 
is to pay greater attention to principles of evidence law in historical 
analysis.  Many have criticized the practice of writing “law office his-
tory,” where lawyers not trained in historical method appeal to the 
authority of history for the purpose of making persuasive legal argu-
ments.  Conversely, others have aimed criticism at the historical pro-
fession for cloaking advocacy as scholarship.  But the fact is that from 
judges to law professors, from practicing attorneys to laypersons, and 
from all areas on the political and ideological spectra, many Ameri-
cans do conceive of the law in historical terms.  Because of this, the 
use of history in law will never go away. 
Historians and legal professionals have also clashed over 
whether and how history can be used to interpret the law.  I conceive 
of the issue as one of disciplinary “jurisdictional” boundaries, where 
the legal and historical professions are each faced with the question 
of what to do when their subject matter overlaps.  The apparent ten-
sion is easier to understand when it is cast as a contrast between com-
peting professional standards: the historians’ teleological goal of de-
termining truth through objectivity versus the legal system’s goal of 
arriving at truth through adversarial practice.  But advocacy and ob-
jectivity—seemingly at cross-purposes—are both in the larger sense 
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systemic endeavors to gain the most just and accurate understanding 
of past events, based on appeals to authority and interpretation.  Plac-
ing the issue in that framework helps us understand that jurisdiction 
over historical evidence need not be a turf battle or a zero-sum game, 
but an overlapping or collaborative venture. 
There are several possible approaches for reconciling the stan-
dards of history with law, but most that have been suggested before 
are generally unrealistic or implausible.  We already have a workable 
analytical tool, however, for evaluating historical claims at law: the law 
of evidence.  While one possible approach toward improving the 
quality of historical evidence might be to use only court-appointed 
historical experts (in pursuit of objectivity), such a practice might 
only exacerbate the existing problems associated with using history in 
law.  Rather, the legal system should treat historical evidence just like 
evidence from other areas of expertise—as facts and interpretations 
that a party may offer, about which the court can determine whether 
baseline criteria of professional reliability are satisfied, and then 
evaluate whether it is admissible, credible, and persuasive.  If another 
party disagrees, it is free to challenge that historical evidence on the 
merits or to offer its own more persuasive interpretation.  A combina-
tion of both adversarial and objective historical expertise, constrained 
by basic principles of evidence law, along with a greater attention to 
professional historical standards, can give us a workable (if not per-
fect) framework for using history reliably in legal interpretation.  This 
can be applied in the litigation process and, by extension, in scholar-
ship. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal profession is undeniably fond of history.  Lawyers, 
judges, and legal scholars love to cite historical evidence and to make 
historical arguments, for many reasons: it conveys a sense of authority 
and legitimacy; it grounds arguments in continuity with tradition and 
precedent; and, not least, because the law is in large part about the 
reconstruction of past events.  Indeed, as Richard Posner has stated, 
“Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most back-
ward-looking, the most ‘past dependent,’ of the professions.”1
For decades, however, historians and lawyers have debated the 
appropriateness and the utility of using history to understand the 
law.2  Many observers in both professions criticize the way in which 
 1 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudi-
cation and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 573 (2000). 
 2 See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 119 (1965) (critiquing the use of history in opinions issued by the Warren 
Court).
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lawyers without historical training treat historical evidence.3  Judges 
and scholars engaged in constitutional interpretation have had a par-
ticularly well scrutinized relationship with the history muse Clio.4  
Within the legal profession, debates have taken place over whether 
using historical evidence in the resolution of legal questions is a 
proper normative methodology, or is even a legitimate enterprise.5  
And, in an extended dialogue with historians, legal scholars and prac-
titioners have also grappled with practical and methodological ques-
tions concerning the application of historical evidence to law.6  Some 
historians and legal scholars question whether it is possible to make 
legitimate connections between past events and present controver-
sies, arguing that history’s salient feature is the uniqueness of the past 
in its own contexts—“the pastness of the past.”7  Applying history to 
 3 LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 167–68 (1996); Mar-
tin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 
523, 554 (1995); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. 
HIST. 11, 30–34 (1992). 
 4 Neil Richards, Clio and the Court: A Reassessment of the Supreme Court’s Uses of His-
tory, 13 J. L. & POL. 809, 810 (1997).  Professor Richards’ title references Professor 
Kelly’s seminal article on the study of the use of history in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.  See Kelly, supra note 2, at 809.  Indeed, the “Clio and the Court” metaphor 
has proven quite catchy, as a number of articles examining the effects of historical 
evidence in law have invoked the Greek muse of history.  E.g., Peter Irons, Clio on the 
Stand: The Promise and Perils of Historical Review, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 337, 354 (1988); 
Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of Confedera-
tion into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 463 (2003); Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Clio 
at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for Legists and Jurists, 83 MINN. L. REV. 377 
(1998); George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused 
and Confused, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 303 (2003); Jay I. Sabin, Clio and the Court Redux: To-
ward a Dynamic Mode of Interpreting Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 369 (1990); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War 
Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169 (1999).  Law review authors invoked Clio even 
before Professor Kelly.  See Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 450, 
451, 483 (1954) (reviewing WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953)).
 5 See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113 (2003) (discussing the contro-
versy over whether it is proper to use historical evidence from notes of the Constitu-
tional Convention to interpret the original meaning of constitutional provisions). 
 6 See generally KALMAN, supra note 3; Flaherty, supra note 3; Larry D. Kramer, 
When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387 (2003); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity 
Through History (Or to It), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587 (1997). 
 7 MICHAEL KAMMEN, SELVAGES AND BIASES: THE FABRIC OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN 
CULTURE 116–17 (1987) (noting the shift among academic historians in the mid-
twentieth century from searching for a “usable past” to focusing on the “‘pastness of 
the past,’ which means to accept the past on its own terms rather than to transmog-
rify it into our own contemporary frame of reference”); Stuart Banner, Legal History 
and Legal Scholarship, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 37, 37 (1998) (“History, or at least history writ-
ten according to the conventions of late twentieth century professional historians, 
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contemporary issues would therefore be inappropriately “presentist.”8  
Most significantly, many observers in both professions criticize the 
way in which non-historically-trained judges and legal scholars use 
history in their analyses.  Critics charge them with writing “law office 
history,” disregarding the professional standards by which history 
ought to be written in order to marshal historical authority for the 
purpose of persuading the reader in favor of the author’s desired re-
sult.9
Many of those who criticize the use of history by lawyers10 ac-
knowledge that one of the major problems inherent in the enterprise 
(beyond the lack of professional training in the standards of histori-
cal method among legal practitioners) is the fundamentally different 
purposes toward which the respective professions are engaged.  Both 
historians and lawyers are, at least ostensibly, engaged in a search for 
“truth”—an accurate interpretation of past events.  But while histori-
ans attempt to do this by being (in theory) objective and neutral, in 
with an emphasis on the ways in which the past differed from the present—history as 
an account of the pastness of the past, as the standard expression goes—enormously 
complicates the task of legal argument.”); Jonathan D. Martin, Historians at the Gate: 
Accommodating Expert Historical Testimony in Federal Courts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1518, 1526 
(2003) (quoting Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bicentennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
1565, 1568 (1987) (arguing that originalist history fails “to understand the past on its 
own terms and maintain a respect for its integrity”)).  Contrast this modern emphasis 
on history’s “pastness” with historian Warren Susman’s 1964 lamentation: “How few 
historians, professional or otherwise, really seem interested in the pastness of the 
past!”  Warren I. Susman, History and the American Intellectual: Uses of a Usable Past, 16 
AM. Q. 243, 257 (1964).
 8 See KALMAN, supra note 3, at 181, 183–84; PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: 
THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 12, 99 
(1988); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Rela-
tionship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 176 (2006); Howard Schonberger, Purposes and 
Ends in History: Presentism and the New Left, 7 THE HIST. TCHR. 448, 448 (1974) (“Pre-
sentism is a fighting word within the historical profession.”); but see David L. Hull, In 
Defense of Presentism, 18 HIST. & THEORY 1, 2 (1979) (defending “certain forms of pre-
sentism” as legitimate). 
 9 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 11 (1996); Flaherty, supra note 3, at 554; see also, e.g., Balkin & Levin-
son, supra note 8, at 165; Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: Rethinking 
the Use of History in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 478 (2006); Amy 
Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.  
1041, 1072 (2005); Jed Rubenfeld, The Paradigm-Case Method, 115 YALE L.J. 1977, 1981 
n.12 (2006). 
 10 For the purposes of this analysis, I will often refer throughout the paper to 
judges, attorneys, and legal scholars collectively as “lawyers” or “legal practitioners.”  
While the difference between writing legal scholarship, advocating a position on be-
half of clients, and judging actual disputes is important, the groups share many of 
the same challenges and critiques regarding the use of history in law, and my primary 
intent is to differentiate law professionals as a group from historians as a group. 
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the legal system the “truth” is (in theory) attained through the adver-
sarial process.  Therefore, each lawyer is bound to act as an advocate 
for one side, interpreting the facts in the light most favorable to her 
client.  Some commentators see this conflict as an argument for re-
stricting the use of history in law, both in the courtroom and, by ex-
tension, in scholarship.11  Others would allow lawyers to “do” history, 
but only with a strict adherence to or a heightened awareness of the 
standards of professional historiography.12  Despite their differences, 
however, in one larger sense law and history share a similar objective.  
At bottom, the legal system and the writing of history are both con-
cerned with establishing the facts of past events and with providing 
interpretations that establish a workable understanding of the truth. 
While the normative debate continues over whether we should 
use history in legal adjudication and scholarship, the fact is that the 
use of history by courts, advocates, and legal scholars has risen 
sharply in recent years.13  I believe that we must recognize that law 
and history are fundamentally intertwined in at least three ways.  
First, history is essential to understand the meaning of legal text in 
constitutions, statutes, and other lawmaking materials, both in legal 
scholarship and in public discourse.  On issues ranging from consti-
tutional war powers, to the role of religion in public life, to the pro-
tection of private property rights, scholars and commentators regu-
larly turn to history when trying to explain the important questions of 
the day.14  Second, our common law traditions of legal practice are 
bound up with interpreting the legal past in the form of our consid-
eration of precedent.  And third, the adversarial litigation system is 
itself an exercise in historical reconstruction of past events.  Recog-
nizing the practical reality that history is heavily used in legal argu-
ments and shows no signs of going away, this Article focuses on the 
latter, methodological issue: when lawyers “do” history, how can we 
 11 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (1988) (criticizing the use of history to support legal arguments based 
on original intent). 
 12 E.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987). 
 13 See generally G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 
88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002) (discussing alternative explanations for the “turn to his-
tory” in constitutional scholarship in the late twentieth century). 
 14 See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., “Poor Relation” Once More: The Supreme Court and the 
Vanishing Rights of Property Owners, 4 CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 39 (2005) (historical analysis 
of property rights); Vincent Phillip Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment 
Clause and the Impossibility of its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585 (2006) (histori-
cal analysis of church/state relations); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” 
Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1005 (2007) (historical analysis of war powers). 
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make sure that they do it “right”—or, at least, with some minimum 
degree of legitimacy? 
I argue that requiring lawyers to adopt strictly the methodologies 
of professional academic historiography reflects a salutary but proba-
bly unattainable goal.  While incorporating the professional stan-
dards of historians to the practice of law would be desirable, requir-
ing lawyers to produce academic-quality historiography would prove 
difficult to achieve in practice and would not necessarily be that help-
ful to the decisionmakers in actual legal controversies.  Given the re-
ality that lawyers will continue to use history, asking lawyers to write 
academic history would potentially be counterproductive as well, dis-
couraging the conscientious production of “good” lawyers’ history 
and ceding the field to the “bad” law office histories in the battle to 
shape public legal understandings. 
Instead, a helpful, if imperfect, apparatus already exists by which 
we can evaluate historical claims and account for some degree of the 
professional norms of the historical profession: the law of evidence.  
Using evidentiary rules and principles to evaluate historical claims 
may not resolve the normative issues.  However, the law of evidence is 
an overlooked, yet potentially effective, way of thinking about how 
history can be used to illuminate legal issues with a minimum level of 
reliability, and without doing violence to the professional standards 
of historians.  Evidence law can be a helpful way to assess the use of 
historical evidence not only in the actual litigation process but, by ex-
tension, in legal scholarship as well. 
Introducing historical evidence at court will pose challenges for 
the judge and the jury.  One response has been to call for the use 
only of court-appointed historians under the evidence rules (to the 
exclusion of expert witnesses proffered by the parties) as a means to 
increase objectivity in the legal process.15  I contend, however, that this 
would only exacerbate the methodological and practical problems of 
history in law.  Instead, the rules of evidence for the adversarial proc-
ess provide a workable system for allowing the court to perform its 
gatekeeping function and for the jury to evaluate competing claims 
with some degree of reliability, without the dangers inherent when 
only one historical interpretation may be considered.  A contest of 
competing historical interpretations may not resolve all historical 
questions to the standards of professional historiography, but as this 
Article will show, controversies over the meaning of the past play a 
 15 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 7, at 1519 (advocating the use of court-appointed 
historians as expert witnesses, rather than allowing the parties to present expert his-
torians of their own choosing). 
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large role in public debate and are also inherent in the historical en-
terprise itself.  The larger point is that evidence law also provides a 
workable analytical framework for analyzing how history should and 
can be used in law, both in litigation and in scholarship. 
In Part II of this Article, I analyze some of the leading arguments 
for and against the use of history in legal interpretation, focusing on 
the apparent cross-purposes of the two professions.  This discussion 
will also chronicle the reality that history is, in fact, heavily used by 
lawyers of all political and ideological persuasions, and thus the issue 
shows no sign of going away.  In Part III, I examine the supposedly 
conflicting goals and irreconcilable standards of the two professions, 
drawing on the sociology of the professions to analyze the conflict in 
terms of contests for professional jurisdiction.  In Part IV, I focus on 
the apparent distinction between objectivity and advocacy as the key 
issue in this area of controversy, and also suggest possible weaknesses 
in the argument that we should necessarily prefer ostensibly “objec-
tive” legal history.  In Part V, I evaluate several of the possible ways of 
overcoming or reducing the dangers attendant when lawyers foray 
into the territory of historians, focusing on the potential application 
of the law of evidence to evaluate historical claims.  I address the 
question of whether historical truth in law is best attained by the use 
of court-appointed historians or by competing historical explanations 
offered through the adversarial process. 
The use of history in law is here to stay.  Thus, while the norma-
tive debate is certainly useful—especially in areas where public un-
derstanding of the meaning of the law plays a role in interpretation—
it is important to attempt to determine how to account for the stan-
dards of professional historiography in the law, and also to craft a 
workable process for evaluating historical evidence, both in the 
courtroom and in legal scholarship. 
II. HISTORY IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION:  
ITS USES AND ITS CRITICS 
If the practice of “law office history” is so pervasive,16 there must 
be some reason that historical evidence is so appealing to lawyers for 
supporting their arguments.  Critics key in on the perceived differ-
ence in the underlying purposes of the respective professions: objec-
tivity versus advocacy.  They argue that because of these different 
 16 Flaherty, supra note 3, at 524 (“Lawyers, judges, and . . . legal academics regu-
larly turn to history when talking about the Constitution, and not merely as a rhe-
torical trope.”). 
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ends, the use of history is irreconcilable with the process of analyzing 
legal issues.  Yet the two professions17 also have something in com-
mon: a basic appeal to authority.  Historians seek to make authorita-
tive interpretations of the past by properly canvassing and weighing 
the sources.  Lawyers invoke legal authority to support their argu-
ments about how legal issues should be resolved.18
Historical evidence is so appealing to lawyers in part because it 
provides historical authority for legal interpretations.19  Daniel Farber 
has noted that “[t]he linkage between past and present is especially 
central in law.”20  Common law adjudication is based upon stare de-
cisis, meaning that the body of prior caselaw that developed over the 
course of time must be interpreted to apply to new controversies.21  
Our substantive doctrines of property, tort, and contract have devel-
oped over centuries of tradition.  In statutory construction, legislative 
history is often consulted to illuminate the intentions of the law’s 
drafters.22  And in American constitutional theory, the past is cen-
trally important both to originalists and nonoriginalists alike.23  The 
mythology of the Founding Fathers undoubtedly plays a large role in 
 17 I use the terms “profession” and “discipline” here to describe law and history 
somewhat more interchangeably than the terms are used in different contexts.  His-
tory is best described as a discipline within the academic profession, while law is its 
own profession with academic members.  But are law professors members of a disci-
pline within the academic profession or of the scholarly wing of the legal profession?  
It may depend on whom you ask. 
 18 See John Philip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195–96 (1993) 
(noting, however, that the different understandings of the role of evidence and au-
thority “make the ways that the two professions interpret the past almost incompati-
ble”). 
 19 Kramer, supra note 6, at 395 (“When lawyers, judges, and legal scholars turn to 
history, they do so because they believe, and want their readers to believe, that a his-
torical pedigree adds authority to their argument.”). 
 20 Daniel A. Farber, Adjudication of Things Past: Reflections on History as Evidence, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1030 (1998). 
 21 Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form, and Function: The Search for Truth and the 
Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 
185, 192 (2002); Posner, supra note 1, at 593. 
 22 Alan G. Gless, A Simple Country Judge’s Musings on the Use of History by Trial Law-
yers, 7 GREEN BAG 2D 343, 343 (2004) (“History is what trial courts do . . . . The trial 
court team engages in historical inquiry whenever it searches for and chooses among 
precedents and interprets statutes and administrative rules.”).  But see ANTONIN M. 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997) (criticizing the use of legislative history 
as an interpretive source). 
 23 David Thomas Konig, Constitutional Contexts: The Theory of History and the Process 
of Constitutional Change in Revolutionary America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND AMERICAN 
CULTURE: WRITING THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 3–4 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo et 
al. eds., 2002) (“[H]istory always has played a major role in constitutional interpreta-
tion . . . .”); Rebecca L. Brown, History for the Non-Originalist, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 69, 72 (2003); Farber, supra note 20, at 1031. 
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understanding the structure of American government for many lay 
people and professionals (perhaps now more than ever if one is to 
judge by the wealth of recent popular books on founding-era fig-
ures).24  So does the general sense of fidelity to original meaning or 
text,25 or the inherent authority or influence of tradition.26
Indeed, the past is itself authoritative to a certain degree in the 
legal system.  Law is at its core based on resolving issues presented by 
past conduct.  The practice of litigation is, to a great extent, an exer-
cise in establishing a certain interpretation of past events.  What actu-
ally happened?  Who is at fault?  The outcome of a case may hinge on 
which side does the best at convincing the court that its story about 
what happened—its version of historical truth—is the most accurate.  
Thus, in spite of the professional differences between law and history, 
it is the very thing that they have in common (at a certain level of ab-
straction) that makes history so powerful as a rhetorical and eviden-
tiary device: the appeal to an authoritative explanation of the past.  
Given its strong appeal and its widespread popularity among practic-
ing lawyers and legal scholars of all ideological stripes, the use of his-
tory in law can not—and should not—be prevented. 
A. “Law Office Histories” Left and Right 
Methodological debates and disciplinary turf battles often take 
place completely within the professions involved, or within the aca-
demic community.  But the issue of history in legal interpretation has 
entered the wider realm of public consciousness.  While courts often 
appealed to history in making decisions,27 the debate began to gain 
wider public recognition in the early 1980s.  During the years of the 
Reagan Administration, to support the appointment of judges with 
conservative values who would practice “judicial restraint,” prominent 
conservative politicians called for a “jurisprudence of original inten-
 24 H.W. Brands, Founders Chic: Our Reverence for the Fathers Has Gotten Out of Hand, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, at 101. 
 25 Rakove, supra note 6, at 1587; see also Konig, supra note 23, at 3 (“Although the 
concept of coherent and conclusive historical intent is itself ahistorical, a search for 
some type of historical ‘fidelity’ remains persistently attractive and intellectually le-
gitimate among scholars.”). 
 26 Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (1993) (arguing 
that tradition should be valued in legal interpretation more for its pedagogical value 
than for any inherent claim to authority qua tradition). 
 27 E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporated the Establishment Clause against the States, and discuss-
ing the appropriateness of Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of a “wall of separation” be-
tween church and state). 
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tion.”28  “The original meaning of constitutional provisions and stat-
utes,” argued then-Attorney General Edwin Meese, provided “the 
only reliable guide for judgment.”29  Judicial fidelity to original intent 
would supposedly result in interpretations of the Constitution that 
showed proper deference to the political branches of government, 
and would limit the degree to which judges decided cases based on 
their “ideological predilections” or subjective policy preferences.30
For the next several years, the debate over originalism raged, 
and it still continues today (indeed, it has seen something of a revival 
recently).31  Justice William Brennan, in response to the originalists, 
asserted that the Constitution’s meaning is not fixed by the world as it 
was at the various moments of enactment, but rather in the aspira-
tions it signified.32  Justice Brennan advocated the metaphor of a “liv-
ing Constitution.”33  The nomination and rejection of Judge Robert 
Bork to the Supreme Court was based in part on controversy over 
Judge Bork’s originalist judicial philosophy.34  And in the legal acad-
emy, the theory of original intent was treated with considerable deri-
sion.  Law professors and legal historians penned a barrage of articles 
discussing the normative and methodological flaws that would plague 
any attempt to conduct modern jurisprudence according to original 
intent.35  Proponents of originalism were charged with placing today’s 
 28 See Edwin Meese III, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 13, 19 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) 
[hereinafter INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION]. 
 29 INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 3. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Original-
ism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive 
Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2005) (reviewing 
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 
(2005)); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Original-
ism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political 
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Mitchell N. 
Berman, Originalism and its Discontents (Plus a Thought Or Two About Abortion) (Univ. of 
Texas Pub. Law Research Paper No. 117, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=957630.
 32 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 
23–34. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 267–350 (1991). 
 35 See, e.g., James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Do-
cumentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1986), reprinted in INTERPRETING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 151 (raising questions about the reliability of found-
ing-era sources about the drafting and ratification of the Constitution); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985), re-
printed in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28, at 53 (criticizing conserva-
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law under the constraints of the irrelevant opinions of long-dead 
white men, with being mouthpieces of the Reagan administration, or 
with fundamentally misreading history.36
To this day, many people still think of the use of history in con-
stitutional interpretation as primarily an interpretive technique fa-
vored by the political right.  To be sure, originalism is usually advo-
cated by conservative or libertarian scholars and judges.37  But 
regardless of the merits of originalism as a normative theory, promi-
nent scholars from a broad variety of interpretive schools and politi-
cal persuasions rely on historical support for their legal analyses.  
Akhil Amar, Bruce Ackerman, Cass Sunstein, and Larry Kramer, to 
name just a few examples, have published important books that offer 
historical accounts of the Constitution’s meaning.38  The different 
perspectives among constitutional theorists continue to engender 
debate, but increasingly they tend to rely on history. 
In fact the modern practice of using history to support legal ar-
guments has had roots on both ends of the political spectrum, both 
before and after the height of the controversy over “original intent” 
in the 1980s.  In 1965, historian Alfred Kelly wrote an influential arti-
cle, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, one of the first prominent 
academic critiques of “law office history.”39  Kelly charged the Court 
with wantonly and inappropriately using historical evidence, often in 
a highly selective manner, in order to achieve results consonant with 
the Justices’ political ideology.40  Kelly’s target, however, was the use 
of history not by conservative Justices, but rather by the liberal and 
activist Warren Court.41
tive originalists for relying on the intentions of individual Framers by arguing that 
the Framers themselves would not have done so). 
 36 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 35, at 88. 
 37 See generally, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); SCALIA, supra note 22; Barnett, supra note 31; 
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 31.  Professor Barnett and other scholars advocate 
a more nuanced version of originalism based on the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text in 1787, rather than trying to ascertain the original intent of the drafters.  
See RAKOVE, supra note 9, at 7–11 (explicating the differences between interpretive 
theories based on original intent, original meaning, and original understanding of 
the Constitution); Kesevan & Paulsen, supra note 5, at 1113. 
 38 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: VOL. 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 
(1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). 
 39 Kelly, supra note 2, at 119. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.; see also Richards, supra note 4, at 809. 
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Kelly was not as concerned about the particular political or ideo-
logical uses toward which historical arguments were directed, but 
rather about the problems inherent in transforming historical facts 
into legal evidence and about the necessity of choosing to emphasize 
some facts and deemphasize others—as lawyers must—in the course 
of shaping a forceful argument.42  Kelly himself, along with noted 
southern historian C. Vann Woodward, had assisted then-NAACP 
counsel Thurgood Marshall in crafting historical interpretations to 
lend support to Marshall’s argument in Brown v. Board of Education,43 
and Kelly later expressed some ambivalence about having partici-
pated in the shaping of history for advocacy purposes.44  Well before 
originalism became prominent in the 1980s, therefore, scholars rec-
ognized that using history as a means of attaining desired legal results 
was a problematic reality, not simply a curious outgrowth of any par-
ticular ideological agenda. 
In the context of the controversy over original intent, most of 
the debates about the use of history in law focused on whether using 
history was appropriate, legitimate, or likely to produce desired re-
sults.  Even today the normative debate is still visited frequently.  
Some commentators on both the left and right maintain that history 
is directly relevant to contemporary constitutional interpretation.45  
Others, including many liberals and even some conservatives such as 
 42 See generally Kelly, supra note 2.  While the historian must also make choices 
about which sources and which facts to emphasize over others, the historian’s need 
to do this is less intuitively obvious than the lawyer’s, and (perhaps) less driven by the 
imperative to conform the evidence to a preferred narrative. 
 43 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 44 See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholar-
ship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 118 (1997).  Kelly said, 
I am very much afraid that . . . I ceased to function as [sic] and instead 
took up the practice of law without a license.  The problem we faced 
was not the historian’s discovery of the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth; the problem instead was the formulation of an 
adequate gloss on the fateful events of 1866 sufficient to convince the 
Court that we had something of an historical case . . . .  It is not that we 
were engaged in formulating lies; there was nothing as crude and naive 
as that.  But we were using facts, emphasizing facts, bearing down on 
facts, sliding off facts in a way to do what Marshall said we had to do . . . . 
Id. at 118–19 (quoting RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S SEARCH FOR EQUALITY 640 (1976)). 
 45 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 38 (liberal); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS, CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (liberal); Michael W. McConnell, The 
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 
(1990) (conservative); Yoo, supra note 4 (conservative). 
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Judge Posner, argue that over-reliance on the historical record is an 
inappropriate or inefficient way to achieve legal results.46
While many legal scholars scathingly derided the originalism 
movement for its reliance on history,47 they nonetheless understood 
intuitively the persuasive power of an appeal to historical authority in 
legitimizing legal arguments.  In the 1980s, several began to advocate 
an approach to constitutional interpretation that was more conso-
nant with their more liberal political views yet nonetheless was delib-
erately built upon a historical pedigree.48  Advocated by Cass Sun-
stein, Frank Michelman, and others, the theory of “civic 
republicanism” sought to apply to constitutional theory the insights 
of classical republican political theory as invoked by members of the 
founding generation.49  Based loosely on the work of historians of the 
founding era, legal advocates of civic republican theory argued that 
the Constitution should be interpreted not simply as a literal docu-
ment protecting individual rights and circumscribing government ac-
tion.50  They argued that the Constitution should instead be seen as a 
more holistic mechanism for achieving the community-oriented goals 
in process and policy that they associated with the classical republican 
ideology of the revolutionary and founding generations.51
While the ensuing debate over this “republican revival” was con-
fined mostly to academic circles, it was a part of the larger normative 
discussion over the use of history in law—but this time the battle lines 
were not as clearly determined by political persuasion.  Originalism 
provided an easy target for both liberal legal scholars and left-leaning 
historians to criticize.  It was this “civic republican” version of lawyers 
appealing to history, however, that generated the most significant 
and sustained examination of the methodological aspects of using 
history in law. Because they shared an academic purpose as well as a 
general political orientation with historians—and because they relied 
on the historians’ own scholarship—the liberal legal scholars who 
sought to apply a civic republican approach to contemporary issues 
had to be taken more seriously. 
 46 Flaherty, supra note 3 (citing liberal anti-history critics); Posner, supra note 1, 
at 573. 
 47 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 35, at 53–54 (arguing that the members of the 
founding generation itself never intended for future generations to be constrained 
by their own eighteenth century understandings). 
 48 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 139. 
 49 Id.; see also Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). 
 50 See generally supra note 49. 
 51 SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 20–21. 
FESTA_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:54:21 PM 
2008] APPLYING A USABLE PAST 493 
 
In its standard narrative,52 the “republican synthesis” in histo-
riography53 was developed by American historians of the founding 
era, based largely on the insights first offered by Bernard Bailyn, 
Gordon Wood, and J.G.A. Pocock.54  Writing in the 1960s and 1970s, 
these and other historians contended that the understanding of the 
intellectual history of the Revolution and Constitution propounded 
by the then-dominant “liberal consensus school”55 was an insufficient 
explanation of the ideology of the founding generation.  Consensus 
historians, such as Daniel Boorstin and Richard Hofstadter, advanced 
theses that purported to explain broad themes of the American ex-
perience.56  Scholars such as Louis Hartz posited that Americans in 
the late eighteenth century had a relatively uniform political outlook 
based largely on the philosophy of John Locke, emphasizing personal 
rights and liberties more than providing for the collective welfare.57  
Baylin, Wood, Pocock, and others, however, argued in various ways 
that late-eighteenth century American political theory in fact drew as 
much or more from the English political tradition variously described 
as “opposition,” “commonwealth,” or “country” ideology.58  In their 
account, Americans were more obsessed with the organic health of 
their society as a whole than with an individual-rights orientation or 
with concern for interest-group pluralism.59
 52 Ironically, the “republican synthesis” has a canonical “founding myth” of its 
own!  See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text; see infra notes 53–55 and accom-
panying text. 
 53 Robert E. Shalhope, Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Under-
standing of Republicanism in American Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972). 
 54 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1967). 
 55 A note on terminology: in the debates over “liberalism” versus “republicanism” 
as the animating political philosophy behind the Constitution, “liberalism” refers to 
an emphasis on individual liberties and interest-group pluralism, while “republican-
ism” refers to the more collective, organic view of the polity prioritizing the “com-
mon good.”  This obviously has the potential to confuse given the contemporary po-
litical orientation of “liberal” as left of center and “republican” as conservative. 
 56 See, e.g., DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE (2002); 
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION: AND THE MEN WHO MADE 
IT (1989). 
 57 LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 8 (1955).  Poor Louis Hartz—
for having argued that the U.S. was founded on Lockean individual-rights principles, 
he now plays the part of the preeminent expositor of the liberal-consensus interpre-
tation, for which he is rewarded with an almost ritual condemnation in most ac-
counts of the historiographical turns toward a republican synthesis. 
 58 See generally supra note 54. 
 59 WOOD, supra note 54; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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Granted, republicanism did not disregard individual liberty as 
one of the foundations for republican values.  But republicanism, ac-
cording to its latter-day expositors, was primarily concerned with 
achieving the “common good,” which could only be accomplished 
through a politics that emphasized “public and private virtue.”  The 
greatest threats to civic life also were couched in moralistic terminol-
ogy as “corruption” and “tyranny.”60  In the early 1970s, Robert Shal-
hope argued that this interpretation of the founding constituted a 
“paradigm change” in historiography as important as those described 
by Thomas Kuhn’s model in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.61  
The “republican synthesis” soon became the dominant school for 
understanding the American founding among historians for the next 
generation.  In fact, more recent scholarship has begun to posit that 
republicanism did indeed embrace individual rights as a bulwark for 
advancing the common good; but in the earlier years during which 
the republican synthesis was advanced, individual liberties had pri-
marily been associated with the allegedly diametrically opposed the-
ory of liberalism or interest-group pluralism that proponents of re-
publicanism sought to dislodge. 
Legal scholars began to find these republican ideas congenial to 
the substantive theories of constitutional interpretation that they ad-
vocated.  Laura Kalman, in The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, has 
written the definitive historians’ critique of this “turn to history” in 
the legal academy.62  As Kalman writes, liberal legal scholars seized 
upon the concepts of “civic virtue” and the “common good” as foun-
dational metaphors for understanding the Constitution.63  By tying 
the Constitution to republican ideology, they could argue for results 
based on community-oriented values rather than on an individualis-
tic, content-neutral rights approach—and they could invoke the his-
torical authority of the founding generation in doing so.  The “repub-
lican revival” in the legal academy generated so much interest that by 
the late 1980s it was the subject of special symposia in prominent law 
reviews and historical journals.64
While republicanism served as the dominant paradigm among 
the ranks of professional historians, other prominent historians such 
as Joyce Appleby, Isaac Kramnick, and John Patrick Diggins also ex-
 60 WOOD, supra note 54, at 36. 
 61 See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); 
Shalhope, supra note 53. 
 62 KALMAN, supra note 3. 
 63 See Michelman, supra note 49, at 1504; Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1541. 
 64 See Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). 
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pressed skepticism towards the ascendancy of the republican synthe-
sis in historiography.65  But then—just as the debate was starting to 
subside in the historical community—historians got wind of how 
members of the legal academy were advancing republicanism as an 
interpretive theory relevant to resolving present-day legal debates.66  
While ordinarily one might expect such borrowing to be flattering—
and while the historians often shared the political views of the legal 
scholars who appropriated republicanism—the historians’ reaction 
ranged from a tepid distancing from the legal scholars’ arguments to 
outright condemnation.67  Even the most avid proponents of the “re-
publican synthesis” as a construct for understanding the intellectual 
history of eighteenth century Americans were lukewarm at best to-
wards the use of it as a construct for explaining legal and policy issues 
today.68
Rather than being pleased that prominent constitutional theo-
rists were reading and using their work, many historians were upset 
that the “civic republicans” in the law schools were using their his-
torical findings, out of historical context, to shore up arguments in a 
contemporary policy debate.69  Modern civic republicanism appeared 
to be “law office history” at its worst, disregarding the canons of his-
torical scholarship for the sake of prescriptions on contemporary pol-
icy issues.70  It was easy for historians to write off the conservative 
originalists.71  Originalists tended to rely mostly on selected primary 
evidence from the founding era purporting to show original intent.  
But the civic republicans, with whose left-leaning politics the histori-
ans often agreed, were citing (and thus, implicating) not simply The 
Federalist or Blackstone, but also the scholarly work of the professional 
historians themselves.72  In this, the civic republicans sought to invoke 
the authority not just of historical evidence itself, but also of the pro-
 65 See generally JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL 
IMAGINATION (1992). 
 66 See Rodgers, supra note 3.  Today most historians understand that there were 
elements of both liberalism and republicanism present in the founding era.  See, e.g., 
MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, at xi (1997) (hoping to “transcend the increasingly fruitless 
debate over whether late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century America was ‘re-
publican’ or ‘liberal’”). 
 67 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 175. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Flaherty, supra note 3, at 554 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
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fessional expertise of the historians who interpreted it.73  In a sense, 
then, the civic republicans were trying to do the conservative original-
ists one better by seeking the imprimatur of the modern scholarship 
in addition to the primary-source evidence from the past. 
Kalman criticizes the appropriation not only of the historiogra-
phy of republicanism by liberal law professors, but also the larger 
“turn to history” by members of the legal academy as a means of 
grounding contemporary policy arguments in historical context.74  
Kalman is suspicious of the legal scholars’ attempt to portray a his-
torical pedigree for their “republican” agenda.  Despite their dis-
claimers that they are only appropriating republicanism as a political 
theory rather than as an authoritative historical account that de-
mands contemporary adherence to historical interpretation,75 Kal-
man understands rightly that they nonetheless want to “imbue the 
past with prescriptive authority.”76  This is problematic because law-
yers’ arguments tend to paint history with a broad brush rather than 
to situate republicanism in the complexity of its historical contexts.  
They seek to invoke an appeal to history without accommodating the 
actual historical development and outcomes of republican ideology.77  
Today, the normative debates over republicanism itself have died 
down, but it still underlies legal-historical analyses sounding in argu-
ments for “the common good.”78  And legal scholars of all persua-
sions are using history more than ever. The charge of inappropriate-
ness, however, lingers. 
Today, once again, originalism is hot—several important articles 
on the subject have recently been published, discussing the norma-
 73 Kalman, supra note 44, at 96. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT (1998); see also Sun-
stein, supra note 49, at 1576. 
 76 Kalman, supra note 44, at 103. 
 77 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 175–78. 
 78 BREYER, supra note 31, at 1; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: 
RECONCILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 3 (1998); Jill E. Fisch, The 
“Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2006) (“Scholars offer a variety of models of the politi-
cal process, but at opposite ends of the spectrum are civic republicanism and some 
form of public choice theory.  Civic republicanism conceives of lawmakers as public-
regarding, viewing ‘legislatures as forums for public deliberation and civic virtue.’ . . . 
‘[C]ivic republicanism portrays government as a moral force for the common good.’” 
(quoting Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
562 (2000))); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, 
Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1311–12 (2002). 
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tive merits of originalism and living constitutionalism,79 and debates 
continue on legal scholarship websites, blogs, and news magazines.80 
Because of this resurgence in historical thinking about the law it is 
more important than ever for us to think about how history is used, 
and by what methods. 
B. The Uneasy Place of History in Constitutional Interpretation 
The story of the controversy over civic republicanism and the 
continuing debate over originalism underscores the fact that the use 
of history in deciding legal issues cannot be tied to or dismissed as 
the tactic of those of any one particular political persuasion, conser-
vative or liberal.  This recognition is important because it moves the 
debate beyond assigning blame to the other camp (and thereby evad-
ing a serious examination of the issue), and because it highlights the 
fact that regardless of normative debates lawyers will continue to use 
historical evidence and arguments in the foreseeable future.  The fact 
that advocates from diametrically opposing positions on the ideologi-
cal spectrum can consult the evidence of history and reach diametri-
cally opposing conclusions may surprise few.  It also speaks to one of 
the underlying questions of the subject: is historical evidence essen-
tially indeterminate when used in legal analysis?  Furthermore, the 
debate over originalism, republicanism, and history in interpretation 
reveals that historians and legal scholars have become concerned not 
just with those normative questions of whether we can or should use 
 79 See generally, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, supra note 31; Ethan J. Leib, Why Superma-
joritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-
Originalists, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1905 (2007); McGinnis & Rappaport, A Pragmatic De-
fense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383 (2007); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Original Interpretative Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. 
COMMENT (2007); Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 551 (2006); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The 
Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Lee J. Strang, Originalism, 
the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Inter-
pretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413 (2006); William Michael Treanor, Original Under-
standing and the Whether, Why, and How of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 
218 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/treanor.html; Jack M. Balkin, 
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008). 
 80 E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Alive and Kicking: Why No One Truly Believes in a Dead Consti-
tution, SLATE, Aug. 29, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2125226/; Dahlia Lithwick, 
Reasons to Go On Living: Does Anyone Believe in a “Living Constitution” Anymore?, SLATE, 
Aug. 23, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2124891/; Posting of Jack M. Balkin, Confu-
sion About Originalism?, to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/08/conf 
usion-about-originalism.html (Aug. 19, 2006, 5:07 PM); Posting of Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Fourth Amendment in the Blogosphere and Constitutional Theory, to Legal The-
ory Blog, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/08/the_fourth_amen.html 
(Aug. 19, 2006, 1:59 PM). 
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history, but also with the methodological question of how it can be 
done in light of the different, and often contradictory, standards of 
the two professions. 
1. Critiques of History in Law 
There is no shortage of scholars who question the use of history-
as-applied by courts and legal scholars—their targets range from the 
Rehnquist Court to political originalists to left-leaning civic republi-
cans in the academy.81  As discussed above, the rise of originalism in 
the 1980s was met with a torrent of criticism on both normative and 
methodological grounds.82  Even as the focus shifted away from con-
servative original-intent originalism in the 1990s, the use of history in 
law continued to draw scrutiny.  Martin Flaherty published an influ-
ential article in 1995 titled History “Lite” in Modern American Constitu-
tionalism raising methodological concerns.83  As the title suggests, Pro-
fessor Flaherty argues that when applying historical arguments to 
questions of constitutional theory, there is a tendency with lawyers—
even with some of the most acclaimed legal scholars—to present a 
version of history that is often watered-down and meagerly supported: 
that is, history “lite.”84  Whether or not their assertions may be sup-
portable by historical inquiry, Flaherty contends, the “habits of poorly 
supported generalization—which at times fall below even the stan-
dards of undergraduate history writing—pervade the work of many of 
the most rigorous theorists when they invoke the past to talk about 
the Constitution.”85
Some prominent scholars have argued that because historical 
inquiry can lead to diametrically opposing or ambiguous conclusions, 
historical evidence should itself be treated with extreme caution.  
Suzanna Sherry, who has herself written from a civic republican per-
spective,86 argues that lawyers should be wary of consulting history to 
reveal authoritative determinations of specific legal issues: “profes-
sional historians do not attempt to answer the questions . . . because 
they recognize that history is indeterminate.”87  Historian James 
 81 See KALMAN, supra note 3, at 134–36, 175. 
 82 See supra Part II.A. 
 83 Flaherty, supra note 3, at 523. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 526. 
 86 See generally Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, (1986); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: 
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995). 
 87 Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 437, 441 (1995). 
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Hutson has raised doubts about “the integrity of the documentary re-
cord,” showing that some of the leading sources of historical evidence 
about the Framing—such as Madison’s oft-cited notes of the Consti-
tutional Convention—may themselves be unreliable, or at minimum 
a less-than-accurate transcription, to the extent that determining 
original intent “may be an impossible hermeneutic assignment.”88
From the conservative side, Judge Posner—famous for his advo-
cacy of judging based on pragmatic principles such as wealth-
maximization, rather than on theories that appeal to external sources 
of authority89—is likewise skeptical of the practicability of using his-
torical evidence.90  In Posner’s view, history has three potential pur-
poses in legal arguments: rhetorical, normative, and informational.91  
History is troublesome as a rhetorical device, according to Posner, 
because the “indeterminacy of most historical inquiries” allows a 
judge to appropriate historical rhetoric as “a useful mask for deci-
sions reached on other grounds.”92  Posner rejects outright the nor-
mative justification for history.93  Though still to be pursued cau-
tiously, Judge Posner seems to believe the only legitimate use of 
historical evidence is to fill informational gaps when deciding cases 
based on precedent.  In such instances, history is consulted because 
of the “path-dependence” of common law reasoning and has “noth-
ing to do with a veneration of the past” itself.94  Regarding the consul-
tation of the work of academic historians to interpret the law, Posner 
argues that it is unacceptable unless there is a clear scholarly consen-
sus on the issue among historians: “Legal professionals are not com-
petent to umpire historical disputes.”95
2. Learning to Live with the Historical Turn 
Other scholars, while counseling caution and often rejecting the 
claim that judges must be strictly constrained by the framers’ intent 
or by original meaning, still believe there is a proper role for histori-
cal inquiry in constitutional analysis.  According to Rebecca Brown, 
history is important for non-originalists because “[o]nly by looking at 
 88 Hutson, supra note 35, at 152 (advocating a more sophisticated “original mean-
ing originalism,” rather than relying primarily on original intent); but see BARNETT, 
supra note 37.  
 89 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1989). 
 90 Posner, supra note 1, at 580. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 593. 
 93 Id. at 588–92. 
 94 Id. at 583, 591. 
 95 Id. at 595. 
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our history . . . can we hope to gain a sense of what values must be 
credited in striking the balance of ordered liberty for our own 
times.”96  Larry Kramer has written that history is normatively impor-
tant because constitutional law is essentially “the end product of his-
torically evolving understandings of the text.”97  Neither does the in-
determinacy of historical evidence, nor the contested nature of 
historical argument, thwart scholars such as Barry Friedman and 
Scott Smith from consulting history: “[h]istory is also contested, but 
the proper role of the constitutional interpreter is to address this 
contest over deeper commitments.”98  Not surprisingly (though not 
inappropriately), some professional historians counsel for greater at-
tention to the academic historiography.  Kalman, after her extended 
critique of the “turn to history,” nonetheless concludes that historical 
inquiry, when done right, can serve useful purposes in illuminating 
constitutional issues.99  Elsewhere, Kalman has argued that both “his-
torians’ legal history” (objective legal history written according to the 
standards of professional historians) and “lawyers’ legal history” (his-
torical interpretations offered for the purpose of making legal argu-
ments) can be both legitimate and useful to scholars and practitio-
ners if done with a certain level of professionalism.100
Historian Jack Rakove, addressing the fact that judges are gener-
ally not trained in the professional standards of historians, neverthe-
less acknowledges that history can have a role in illuminating legal 
questions: “[s]kepticism about the limits of judicial reasoning does 
not require a blanket dismissal of the possibility that historically 
grounded approaches . . . might indeed yield fruitful results.”101  Pro-
fessional historiography may not necessarily point to ultimate conclu-
sions on legal issues, but historians can help in “narrowing and rank-
ing the available range of meanings, or perhaps more important, [in] 
 96 Brown, supra note 23, at 77; see also Brown, supra note 26, at 180 (“[T]he Con-
stitution should be viewed as part of a body of tradition that can teach present and 
future generations the principles that will allow society not merely to change, but to 
mature.”). 
 97 Kramer, supra note 6, at 388; see also Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and 
Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997) (“[H]istory is essential to constitu-
tional theory because our understandings, our values, and the actual structure of our 
government are constantly, inevitably, changing.”). 
 98 Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 1, 87 (1998). 
 99 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 236. 
 100 Kalman, supra note 44, at 114–15; see also Richard B. Bernstein, Charting the Bi-
centennial, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1578 (1987) (noting, and criticizing, the disparity 
between “lawyers’ legal history” and “historians’ legal history”). 
 101 Rakove, supra note 6, at 1588. 
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demonstrating the sheer implausibility of particularly egregious mis-
readings of the text.”102  William Forbath agrees: “[t]he historians’ 
role is to scold the law scholars for doing law-office history, for ‘get-
ting it wrong,’ ironing out context and discontinuity to muster the 
past into present service.”103
These scholars’ approaches to history in law are much more real-
istic.  The use of history in legal discussions has increased greatly over 
the last generation.104  As Larry Kramer proclaimed, invoking Jeffer-
son tongue-in-cheek, “[w]e are all originalists, we are all non-
originalists.”105  The use of history has seemingly won the day, or at 
least its opponents have temporarily withdrawn from the field.  And 
many acknowledge that the quality of some work in the area has 
greatly improved its accordance with historiographical standards.106  
This might ameliorate, if not eliminate, the risks inherent in lawyers’ 
doing history.  However, the old debates over originalism are resur-
facing.  A number of recent and forthcoming articles by major schol-
ars promise to revive the public debate over whether and how histori-
cal meaning should interpret contemporary legal interpretation.107
C. Clio in the Courthouse 
The historical turn in law is not limited to the pages of the law 
reviews.  In actual litigation, history is discussed frequently.  The Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court engage in historical analysis all the time.  
Most of the current Justices have cited The Federalist in an opinion, for 
 102 Id. at 1589. 
 103 William E. Forbath, Constitutional Change and the Politics of History, 108 YALE L.J. 
1917, 1917 (1999). 
 104 Richards, supra note 4, at 834. 
 105 Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 677 (1999).  Inter-
estingly, this turn of phrase has become so popular as to be attributed not only to 
Dean Kramer, but also to Lawrence Tribe, see Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: 
The Court’s New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581, 
585 (2002) (citing Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 22); Sanford 
Levinson, see Richard B. Saphire, Doris Day’s Constitution, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1443, 1445 
(2000) (citing Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Per-
formance of Legal Roles, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 495, 496 (1996)); and Ronald 
Dworkin, see Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1998) (citing Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra 
note 22 (distinguishing different forms of originalism)).  I take this preponderance 
of distinguished potential authors as evidence that the sentiment is generally ac-
cepted among many leading constitutional theorists.
 106 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 239. 
 107 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.  1737 (2007); 
Balkin, supra note 79; see also Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitution-
alism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the current state of the 
originalism-vs.-living constitutionalism debate). 
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example, to invoke historical authority from the founding era.108  It is 
a frequent occurrence for one opinion to invoke historical evidence 
as authority for a decision (such as whether Congress has the power 
to pass a certain law), and then be opposed by an opinion from a dis-
senting Justice with an equally engaging discussion of how the major-
ity misreads history.109
One of the classic examples of this phenomenon was the 1997 
decision Printz v. United States.110  Justice Scalia wrote for the majority 
in Printz holding the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act111 un-
constitutional.112  Justice Scalia examined the historical understand-
ing of federalism, citing The Federalist over twenty times.113  In dissent, 
Justice Stevens cited The Federalist ten times;114 Justice Souter went 
even further, stating that “it is The Federalist that finally determines 
my position,” citing Publius ten times in directly challenging Justice 
Scalia’s historical interpretations.115  Printz shows how attractive his-
torical evidence is to legal decisionmakers, especially historical evi-
dence that invokes the founders.  Opinions of the Supreme Court 
from the last decade are positively rife with historical citations, not 
only in structural cases such as Printz but also in cases in the individ-
ual-rights area, including First Amendment speech and religion is-
sues,116 Fourth and Fifth Amendment criminal procedure issues,117 
the death penalty,118 and the historical meaning of individual prop-
 108 Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court and The Federalist: A Citation List and 
Analysis, 1789–1996, 85 KY. L.J. 243, 253–54 (1996); Buckner F. Melton, Jr. & Jennifer 
J. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Federalist: A Supplement, 1996–2001, 90 KY. L.J. 415, 
417–18 (2001). 
 109 Compare, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (Kennedy, J.) 
(citing The Federalist), with id. at 549 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist); 
compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910–14, 919–24 (1997) (Scalia, J.) (cit-
ing The Federalist), with id. at 943–47, 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing The Federal-
ist) and id. at 971–76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist and stating that he 
finds it determinitave to his decision). 
 110 Printz, 521 U.S. 898. 
 111 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993) (commanding state and local law enforcement officers to conduct back-
ground checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform certain related 
tasks).
 112 521 U.S. at 934–35. 
 113 Id. at 909–35. 
 114 Id. at 939–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. at 971–76 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 116 E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 117 E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
 118 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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erty rights,119 to name just a few.  The Court’s cases often result in 
opinions based on historical interpretation that, in turn, inspire pub-
lic debate over the meaning of the Constitution.120
Historical interpretation often takes place in the lower appellate 
courts as well.  One example is Second Amendment litigation.  There 
is a circuit split over whether there is an individual or only a collective 
right to keep and bear arms, and therefore whether certain gun con-
trol measures violate the Constitution.  The Ninth121 and Fifth Cir-
cuits122 split over this issue as a historical matter, and in 2007 the D.C. 
Circuit weighed in on the side of the individual rights interpreta-
tion—an interpretation that the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed 
based in large part on history.123  All three Circuit Courts and the U.S. 
Supreme Court engaged in historical analyses of what the Second 
Amendment has been interpreted to mean throughout its history.  
Nor is the increase in judicial use of history found only in the federal 
appellate context.  As one state judge noted, “more and more state 
courts are turning to history to support their decisions as to the 
meaning of their constitutions.”124  Nor is it confined to courts of ap-
peal: history is also litigated at trial, sometimes even involving histori-
ans as expert witnesses.125  As noted, a trial is itself in a very great 
sense a tribunal convened precisely to render a judgment based on a 
historical reconstruction of past events. 
The question, then, is whether we should throw up barriers to 
using history, in order to avoid the risk of doing it incorrectly, or 
should we recognize the undeniable fact of its pervasive, irresistible 
appeal and increasing use, and try to help lawyers apply history well?  
If there is hope for the application of history to law (or even if not, 
 119 E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 511–14 (2005) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting). 
 120 E.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063–64 (2007) (discussing 
history of remedies at law); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2719–22 (2006) (dis-
cussing history of criminal law); Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–64 (discussing historical 
meaning of Eighth Amendment); Kelo, 545 U.S. at 511–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(discussing history of property rights). 
 121 Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects only a collective right to bear arms). 
 122 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding the indi-
vidual-rights interpretation of the Second Amendment). 
 123 Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (upholding the 
individual-rights interpretation based on a historical reading of Second Amend-
ment).  The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari.  District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 07-290). 
 124 Honorable Jack L. Landau, A Judge’s Perspective on the Use and Misuse of History in 
State Constitutional Interpretation, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 451, 451 (2004). 
 125 See infra Part V.C.2. 
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given the fact that lawyers are going to do it anyway) the next ques-
tions, then, involve understanding what these referred-to professional 
standards are, and how they might be applied across the disciplinary 
boundary.  To the extent that history-in-law is going to be done, we 
should attempt to find a framework for doing it as well as possible, in 
order to provide analysis and interpretations that are valuable for 
both scholars and policymakers. 
III. PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, “JURISDICTION,”  
AND BORDER PATROLS 
A. Maintaining Professional Jurisdictions 
To most historians and legal scholars, this debate seems to re-
volve around the substantive areas where history is applied to ques-
tions of law (often involving constitutional interpretation or other 
questions of public law) and the methodological standards for inter-
preting history correctly, as best exemplified in the debates over 
originalism.126  Beyond the norms of law and history, however, an in-
quiry into the literature on the sociological history of the professions 
suggests a more subtle issue that might be underlying this dialogical 
contest: an inter-professional struggle for “jurisdiction” over knowl-
edge.  This literature on the professions has not been adequately 
studied by scholars seeking to understand the relationship between 
other academic fields and law, especially considering the popularity 
of interdisciplinary legal scholarship.127
In the study of the professions, leading scholars have pointed 
out that one of the defining characteristics of a profession is that it 
has “jurisdiction” over certain areas of skill or knowledge.128  Eliot 
Freidson’s model posits that a “profession” is characterized by certain 
traits that combine to allow its members to “make a living while con-
trolling their own work.”129  The status of an occupation as a “profes-
sion” depends on whether it meets these certain characteristics.130  
 126 See generally INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 28. 
 127 See, e.g., Anthony D’Amato, The Interdisciplinary Turn in Legal Education (North-
western University Pub. Law Research Paper No. 06-32, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=952483 (critiquing the popularity of interdisciplinary 
scholarship in the legal academy). 
 128 ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001).  One of the other 
leading paradigms has been the “functionalist” model associated with Talcott Par-
sons.  See generally TALCOTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); TALCOTT PARSONS, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937). 
 129 FREIDSON, supra note 128, at 17. 
 130 Id. 
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Freidson contrasts professionalism with two other ideal-typical occu-
pational models: the free market, and the rational-legal bureaucracy 
theorized by Max Weber.131  Freidson’s general model for profession-
alism has five characteristics: (1) it engages in specialized work in an 
established field that involves theoretical knowledge; (2) it requires a 
high degree of formal training; (3) the profession has exclusive juris-
diction over the type of work it performs and over its members; (4) it 
has a sheltered position that is protected by the specific credentials 
required for membership and by the profession’s exclusive ability to 
provide both the training and the credentials; and (5) each profes-
sion has its own professional “ideology” that involves a devotion to 
the process and applications of specific professional standards to the 
area of expertise it governs.132  A profession’s ideology claims special-
ized knowledge that is authoritative.133  A common thread running 
through these traits is the ethic of service—a commitment to the 
quality and public service of the work performed.134  Law and history 
can both be treated as professions under Freidson’s model.135  Law, of 
course, along with medicine and the ministry, has for centuries been 
regarded as one of the traditional professions.136
The existence of academic history and law as separate profes-
sions in our society may help explain in part the controversies over 
using historical evidence in law.  According to Freidson’s model, the 
essence of a profession lies in its ability to operate with autonomy and 
to exercise control over its members.  Some scholars described in the 
previous section, such as Professors Kalman, Rakove, and Forbath, 
seemed to accept the use of history by lawyers, but only when super-
 131 Id.; see also FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 295–301 (H. H. Gerth & C. 
Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958) (theorizing three types of authority in human ex-
perience: (1) traditional authority; (2) charismatic authority; and (3) rational-legal 
bureaucracy). 
 132 FREIDSON, supra note 128. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 108. 
 135 Law overall is generally regarded as one of the traditional professions, but it is 
not clear whether academic historians constitute a “profession” or simply a “disci-
pline” within the larger scholarly profession.  I do not attempt to resolve that ques-
tion but assume for the issues discussed in this paper that the translation of the 
products of history to the practice of law at some level constitutes a crossing of pro-
fessional boundaries. 
 136 ELLIOT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE 
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM 1 (1996).  Other traditional professions include engineering 
and the university professoriate; in the modern era the concept of professionalism 
has also been applied to accounting, the military, and managers in public or corpo-
rate bureaucracies.  See HAROLD PERKIN, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: PROFESSIONAL ELITES 
IN THE MODERN WORLD 1 (1996). 
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vised to some degree by members of the historical profession.137  In 
other words, historians are perhaps troubled to see non-professional 
historians (i.e., lawyers) appropriating their work without appealing 
to the professionals for approval in assessing the standards or the na-
ture of the history they produce.  This is a challenge to the historians’ 
control over the services they provide.  Professor Kalman describes her 
own critiquing of law office history as an exercise in “border pa-
trol.”138  This is consistent with Freidson’s observation that profes-
sionalism is based partly on control over knowledge.139
I do not mean to suggest that historians have somehow con-
sciously conspired to foreclose all nonhistorians’ prerogative to in-
terpret history and to thus threaten historians’ monopoly over provid-
ing historical interpretations.140  But historians’ professional interests 
might help explain why they have such concern over this issue.  They 
see laymans’ history done all the time: in the media, by politicians, by 
lay writers for popular audiences, and others.  Indeed, the historical 
profession has clearly—and to a great degree deliberately—distanced 
itself from the writing of popular history for the masses.141  While aca-
demic historians often disregard popular histories written by nonaca-
demic historians (such as military histories, celebratory biographies, 
or History Channel television fare), they are more likely to criticize 
the popular histories on the merits than they are to challenge the 
nonacademic writers’ very right to try to interpret the past. 
But lawyers’ use of history is more problematic because it is a 
more direct challenge to the historians’ control over the subject mat-
ter.  When a court interprets history, its version becomes “official” 
and (legally) authoritative.142  The court’s historical interpretation 
may become part of the findings of fact, determine the outcome of 
the case, be entered in the official public records, become available 
for citation as binding precedent, and even establish a form of “offi-
cial” public meaning of laws or of the Constitution itself.143  In other 
 137 See supra Part I.B.2; see also Reid, supra note 18. 
 138 Kalman, supra note 44. 
 139 FREIDSON, supra note 128, at 96 (“What gives [professional schools’ faculty] and 
the profession of which they are a part the capacity to preserve and even expand 
their jurisdiction is the fact that in addition to teaching, their faculties can devote 
themselves to systematizing, refining, and expanding the body of knowledge and skill 
over which the profession claims jurisdiction.”). 
 140 However, the tension between scholarly or academic history and popular or 
amateur history is a longstanding issue in the historical profession. 
 141 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, PAST IMPERFECT (2003). 
 142 See generally Richards, supra note 4. 
 143 See Gordon Morris Bakken, The Promise of American History in Law, 24 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 277, 285 (1988). 
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words, lawyers and judges can create an authoritative interpretation 
of the past that stands as an official government record, which can 
have real-world effects. 
When the Supreme Court makes historical analyses, the effects 
are even more far-reaching.  Supreme Court opinions not only be-
come nationwide legal precedent, but can even in turn shape our col-
lective public memory about the meaning of the past.  One need look 
no further than the Court’s First Amendment Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, for example, where the Court in 1947 took Thomas 
Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists advocating a “wall of separa-
tion” between church and state and turned it into a constitutional 
doctrine that operates to guide courts’ interpretation of the original 
meaning of the First Amendment.144  This metaphor has proven pow-
erful not only in jurisprudence but also in the public imagination be-
cause of its historical pedigree, coming from Jefferson himself, and its 
implicit historical authority.  Regardless of its normative merits, Pro-
fessor Kelly in 1965 pointed to the Everson case and the church-state 
cases in general as an example of particularly bad law office history by 
lawyers and by the courts themselves.145
Likewise, the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence de-
pends on our collective sense of history because “evolving standards 
of decency” are contrasted with the supposedly fixed 1789 standards 
for what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.146  The block-
buster federalism cases of the Rehnquist Court, such as Printz, City of 
Boerne v. Flores, and others, all rested in part on the Justices’ historical 
understandings of constitutional structure.147  No matter where the 
chips fall in terms of results, it is clear that the stakes for using history 
in law are especially high because legal decisions establish an inter-
pretation of truth for past events. 
Returning to the sociology of the professions, Andrew Abbott of-
fers a different paradigm—though one no less revealing to the pre-
sent question.  Like Freidson, Abbott focuses on a profession’s ability 
to maintain its power and control.148  Abbott, however, opposes the 
 144 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 
545 U.S. 677, 708 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 878 
(2005). 
 145 Kelly, supra note 2. 
 146 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 147 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997). 
 148 ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF 
EXPERT LABOR 86–91 (1988). 
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synthetic nature of Freidson’s model and argues instead that we 
should study the work the profession actually does as the best way to 
understand how it operates.  The most important of Freidson’s char-
acteristics in this context is the concept of “jurisdiction.”149  Accord-
ing to Abbott, professions compete with rival occupations for recog-
nition of their cognitive claims and for the exclusive right to deal with 
specific types of problems.150  The definitions of tasks (e.g., what con-
stitutes historiography) and the patterns of jurisdiction (e.g., who 
gets to write history) are contingent, varying with changing social cir-
cumstances.151  Control over professional jurisdiction is therefore the 
key to maintaining professional autonomy.152
The concept of “jurisdiction” is an interesting one to apply to 
this discussion because of its obvious particular meaning for lawyers.  
Of course, the issue of legal jurisdiction of courts and government 
bodies has a particular meaning in law.  Jurisdiction, in law, means 
power—power to decide a case, power to order the legal rights and 
status of persons and property in a certain domain.153  The concept of 
“jurisdiction” of different professions and the boundaries of their 
subject matter and methods may seem less clear and more con-
structed than traditional legal jurisdiction, but that is not necessarily 
the case.  I think, however, that this underscores the point perfectly.  
Because again, if we look at the legal history of the United States, we 
can see that legal jurisdiction itself is a constructed, and contested, 
concept.154  The jurisdictional framework of American law demon-
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 JAMES FLEMING, JR., ET. AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 55 (5th ed. 2001).  Or, as I tell my 
students, it is a concept of authority exemplified in the classic car-chase movie sce-
nario, where the local sheriff stops his pursuit at the state or county line due to a 
perceived lack of jurisdiction (and notwithstanding any doctrine of hot pursuit).  But 
see SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT (Universal Pictures 1977) (Jackie Gleason as Texas Sheriff 
Buford T. Justice continues pursuit of Burt Reynolds as “The Bandit” from Texas to 
Georgia, despite repeated assertions against his jurisdiction from other law-
enforcement agencies). 
 154 See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (holding that it was 
not a violation of due process for a state to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant, but splitting 4-4-1 over the rationale for upholding jurisdiction).  In 
Burnham, Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasized the historical foundations of jurisdic-
tional theory based on sovereignty, id. at 609–11, while Justice Brennan’s concur-
rence argued that the “minimum contacts” test of fair play and substantial justice 
should govern the inquiry into whether allowing jurisdiction was consistent with due 
process.  Id. at 630.  Neither opinion commanded a majority, leaving us an unsettled 
jurisdiction doctrine.  Id. at 609–15, 623–27, 629–34.  This underscores the notion 
that jurisdiction, even in the legal sense, is something that is developed by authorities 
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strates this with different jurisdictional mandates for different levels 
and bodies of government and for different courts, all set forth by 
constitutions and statutes and interpreted in case law.  Why do states 
have sovereignty in some areas but not others?155  Why do the federal 
courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear certain cases based on the 
subject matter?  In other cases, different levels of government or dif-
ferent courts of the same sovereign have concurrent jurisdiction.  
There is no foreordained jurisdictional framework; it was and is a 
constructed system.  It is the result of how we have collectively de-
cided—through the ratification of the Constitution and through our 
legislators—to set jurisdictional rules as a means of finding the best 
balance under the circumstances.  Specific choices were made in the 
Constitutional Convention and the 1789 Judiciary Act156 and were re-
fined over time to establish the actual framework of jurisdictional 
rules that govern our legal system.  This framework is the result of 
particular choices that were seen as the best way to adapt principles 
to reality.  Our particular structure of jurisdiction in U.S. courts was 
crafted and tweaked to reflect decisions about the proper distribution 
of power and authority to determine questions of law. 
We are faced with a similar question in discussing the use of his-
tory in law.  Rather than fall back on the disciplinary boundaries that 
the legal and historical professions constructed for themselves, we 
ought to work toward an accommodation that recognizes the reality 
that the subject matter is going to overlap in the minds of Americans.  
Outside the academy, people tend to think of history and law to-
gether in understanding the foundations of our common society and 
government.  We should recognize that the de facto lines of jurisdic-
tion are going to be contingent on our collective decisions, and will 
also be sometimes obscure. 
Furthermore, according to Professor Abbott, academic knowl-
edge is also subject to this sort of interprofessional rivalry over “intel-
lectual jurisdiction.”157  Indeed, in arguing that the standards of aca-
demic history are not necessarily applicable in the legal environment, 
on a case-by-case basis to resolve actual disputes over the assertion of power in an 
area.  See also William Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167 (1956) (introducing the idea that some philosophical 
concepts are “essentially contested”). 
 155 Compare Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004) (holding that Title II 
of the ADA did validly abrogate state sovereignty), with Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. 
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA did not abrogate 
state sovereignty). 
 156 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9–16, 1 Stat. 73. 
 157 ABBOTT, supra note 148, at 75. 
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Professor Tushnet contends, “[t]he criteria for evaluating [law-office 
history] . . . must be drawn from legal practice rather than from his-
torical practice.”158  I agree, and will elaborate on this observation in 
arguing for the application of evidence law rather than academic his-
torical methodology in evaluating historical claims at law.159  Framing 
the debate over the use of history in law as that of a sociological con-
test for control over the jurisdiction of historical knowledge provides 
a useful analogy for thinking about what may be at stake, or why 
members of the respective professions should care. 
B. Translating Standards Across the Disciplinary Divide 
I turn now to the question of interdisciplinary scholarship to see 
what insights can be gained for applying the methods and theories of 
one body of knowledge to another.160  Since Kelly wrote his critique 
of the Court’s attempts at history in 1965, interdisciplinary scholar-
ship has increased dramatically in the legal academy.161  Perhaps this 
phenomenon derives from the common observation that lawyers are 
“natural scavengers”;162 perhaps it is because legal scholars tend to as-
say into other fields without compunction, begetting what one 
scholar has called the “lawyers-as-astrophysicists” phenomenon;163 
perhaps it is part of a larger academic trend in the wake of postmod-
 158 Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 934–35 (1996). 
 159 See infra Part V.C. 
 160 Having just completed a discussion of law and history as “professions,” treating 
them here as “disciplines” might sound different.  However, it is not my intent to de-
termine whether law and history are more properly characterized as professions or 
disciplines.  I described them as “professions” above for the light it potentially sheds 
on the contest behind the debate; I describe them as “disciplines” here because my 
inquiry regards the narrower question of how academic knowledge can be applied 
from one area of academic study to another.  This risks confusing the practice with 
the scholarship of law, but, as noted above, I treat them as essentially similar enter-
prises for the purposes of this paper. 
 161 See Richards, supra note 4, at 809. 
 162 See Rodgers, supra note 3, at 33; see also Kathryn Abrams, Law’s Republicanism, 97 
YALE L.J. 1591, 1591 (1988) (“Legal scholars are natural scavengers.”).  Of course, in 
this Article I am guilty of “scavenging” from several disciplines including U.S. history, 
sociology, and political science, as well as a variety of fields of legal scholarship. 
 163 Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public 
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979) (quoted in 
Melton, supra note 4, at 384).  Tushnet complained that some legal scholars seemed 
to think “that the generalist training of lawyers allows any lawyer to read a text on as-
trophysics over the weekend and launch a rocket on Monday.”  Id. at 1338 n.140. 
FESTA_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:54:21 PM 
2008] APPLYING A USABLE PAST 511 
 
ernism and cultural studies;164 or perhaps there is some other reason.  
Whatever the cause, the result has been not only an increase in the 
number of professionally-trained legal historians, but also a recogni-
tion of the problems that come with applying the standards of one 
discipline to the work of another, as a parade of “law-ands” has per-
vaded the academy—law and economics, law and philosophy, law and 
literature, law and political science, as well as law and history.165  To 
understand how history might be applied to law, we can find insights 
by reviewing other discussions about whether and how to conform to 
the standards of another external discipline while engaging in “law 
and . . .” studies: the intersection of law and social science. 
Other prominent scholars have discussed the application of so-
cial science methods to legal scholarship.  Political scientists Lee Ep-
stein and Gary King contend that legal scholars attempting to con-
duct empirical studies should adhere to the professional standards 
for empirical research in the social sciences.166  They argue that legal 
scholars who purport to engage in empirical research fail, with alarm-
ing regularity, to pay due attention to those disciplinary standards for 
empirical analyses—the “rules of inference.”167  According to Epstein 
and King, the empirical research process must be conducted accord-
ing to general guidelines of scholarly inquiry.168  They contend that 
legal scholars frequently overlook important rules that govern how 
social scientists form research questions, select evidence for observa-
tion, summarize data, and make both descriptive and causal infer-
ences.169  Epstein and King paint a dim picture of the state of legal 
scholarship and advocate a heightened self-consciousness of method-
ology by both the producers (the legal academy) and the consumers 
(attorneys and judges) of legal research.170  It may be arguable that 
the state of affairs has improved in the last several years with the pro-
gress of the Empirical Legal Studies movement,171 but undoubtedly 
Epstein and King’s critique points to a serious issue. 
 164 Or perhaps it is because when one does interdisciplinary scholarship, one is 
usually writing partly outside the expertise of any given reader—with the potential to 
be fooling half of the audience. 
 165 See KALMAN, supra note 44, at 91. 
 166 Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 167 Id. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. 
 170 Id. at 12. 
 171 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Why do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1741 (2004); Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of 
Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811 (2006); Tracey E. George, An Empirical 
Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006). 
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To analogize the theory of Professors Epstein and King to the 
debate over the methodological standards of history, one might ar-
gue that any lawyer who wants to invoke historical evidence or au-
thority ought to learn and apply all of the rules of academic history.  
While the specific methods differ from those of political or social sci-
ence, historians are similarly charged with making valid and reliable 
assessments constructed around a chain of inferences based on the 
available evidence.  And like lawyers researching political science, 
lawyers consulting history might be required to adopt the historian’s 
standards of objectivity and reliability for evaluating primary and sec-
ondary sources, weighing historical evidence, making descriptive in-
ferences, and for attempting to explain historical causation.  This 
would be undoubtedly a good goal toward which legal studies of his-
tory should strive, and we should certainly encourage it to the maxi-
mum extent possible.  We should applaud the application of these 
standards when done properly, putting aside the question of whether 
such application is practically feasible to expect from lawyers and 
judges with limited time and without historical training.  Professors 
Epstein and King’s critique is certainly well-taken, and provides a 
valuable caution to those attempting to use historical evidence in law. 
But it may not necessarily be a complete indictment of the basic 
reliability of lawyers’ histories, however, if they fail to achieve com-
pletely these professional historians’ standards.  Returning to the 
empirical social science analogy, Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Ver-
meule argue—in a response to Professors Epstein and King—that re-
quiring strict adherence to the rules of inference is appropriate for 
empirical legal scholarship per se, but that such strict adherence is 
misplaced in the vast body of legal scholarship that has normative, in-
terpretive, and doctrinal purposes, rather than simply empirical 
ones.172  In support of their argument, Goldsmith and Vermeule 
comment that “[l]egal scholars often are just playing a different game 
than the empiricists play, which means that no amount of insistence 
on the empiricists’ rules can indict legal scholarship—any more than 
strict adherence to the rules of baseball supports an indictment of 
cricket.”173  In particular, those who study legal questions face “trade-
offs between rigor and accuracy, on the one hand, and timeliness, 
relevance, and utility, on the other.”174  These tradeoffs are especially 
important for the law, which is “professionally and practically in-
 172 Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 153–54 (2002). 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 154. 
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volved in the business of courts and other governmental institutions 
that must constantly reach decisions despite profound empirical un-
certainty.”175
More particularly, Goldsmith and Vermeule argue that the claim 
that legal scholarship must be “objectively” correct overlooks the pos-
sibility that, when viewed systematically, the institution of legal schol-
arship is in fact well equipped to sort out arguments and reach an 
approximation of truth.176  They write that “the contest of ‘particular 
versions’ of truth ventilated by legal articles that are tendentious 
when taken separately may, at the systemic level, produce increasingly 
accurate approximations of truth.”177  In other words, while the stan-
dards of another discipline (such as history) toward objectivity would 
in theory be nice to replicate, in practice legal analyses depend more 
on the adversarial process: “[I]t is the premise of our litigation sys-
tem, that the aggregate effect of individual tendentiousness is a fully 
rounded picture of the truth . . . . In both the academic and court-
room settings, there is a system-level justification for the competitive 
production of evidence . . . .”178  Thus, drawing on Goldsmith and 
Vermeule, the adversarial nature of legal inquiry might serve as an 
adequate mechanism to systemically protect the integrity of the his-
torical record when discussed by legal scholars through the produc-
tion and evaluation of competing versions of historical evidence.  
This difference is reflected in the prevailing norms of publishing in 
the respective fields: while historical (and most other humanities and 
social science) journals are peer-reviewed and ostensibly objective, 
law reviews are famously student-edited, wide-ranging in subject mat-
ter and points of view presented, and more given to debates, to re-
sponse articles, and symposia to further the exchange and debate of 
ideas. 
In the law, therefore, we might in fact prefer to have competing 
historical accounts from which to develop a fuller picture of the past 
through the process of considering and weighing the actual historical 
evidence on its merits, rather than to try to rely solely on one pur-
portedly authoritative interpretation.  This idea mitigates the concern 
that in the legal system advocates develop arguments for various posi-
tions.  In fact, it turns that critique on its head by pointing out that 
 175 Id.  In addition, the demand for up-to-date relevance in legal scholarship may 
have led to the professional norm of publishing quickly and often in the legal acad-
emy.  See Flaherty, supra note 3, at 552–55. 
 176 See Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 172, at 156. 
 177 Id.. 
 178 Id. 
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the very purpose of the competing adversarial accounts is to have the 
court—or the legal academy as a whole—establish a reliable interpre-
tation of the past by assessing and weighing the arguments and evi-
dence from different versions.  And it reaffirms that the ultimate end 
of both the legal and historical processes is to determine the truth to 
the best extent possible within the inherent limitations of their re-
spective missions. 
The eminent constitutional historian John Phillip Reid, however, 
takes a less tolerant view of the potential problems of historical evi-
dence in an adversarial system.179 “[T]he crossing of history with law,” 
he writes, “is a mixture containing more snares than rewards, as it 
risks confusing rules of evidence basic to one profession with canons 
of proof sacrosanct to another.”180  Reid believes that what appears to 
many as “a similarity between the methodology of law and the meth-
odology of history”181 in reality is simply that “[t]he lawyer and the 
historian . . . go to the past for evidence, but there the similarity 
largely ends.”182  The fundamental difference between the ap-
proaches is that the historian’s duty is to “the logic of evidence,” 
while the lawyer seeks “the logic of authority,” in order to settle the 
legal question.183  These different “logics” produce different mean-
ings, and the adversary ethic of the legal process is what leads to the 
production of “law office history.”184  Reid, like other scholars, argues 
for a watchdog role for academic historians when lawyers attempt in-
terdisciplinary historical studies: “We have to learn to harass historical 
jurisprudence, not reject it,” because professional historians, unlike 
lawyers, are versed in “the academic canons of the historical 
method.”185  I believe that legal scholars should welcome historians to 
perform this watchdog role and to collaborate whenever possible, but 
that ultimately it is our own responsibility to arrive at historical analy-
ses that are both well-grounded and contribute to the advancement 
of legal interpretation.  Or, to put it another way, we should not 
completely cede jurisdiction over the application of history to law. 
 179 See generally Reid, supra note 18. 
 180 Id. at 193. 
 181 Id. at 193–94. 
 182 Id. at 195. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 197. 
 185 Reid, supra note 18, at 204–05. 
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IV. ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY IN THE PROFESSIONAL  
STANDARDS OF LAWYERS AND HISTORIANS 
What, in fact, are these “standards” to which the commentators 
keep referring, when critiquing the attempts of lawyers to “do his-
tory”?  As noted above, the fundamental tension seems to be between 
the historian’s supposed creed of objectivity and the lawyer’s duty of 
advocacy.  This presumed objectivity-versus-advocacy “tension” is itself 
worth analyzing.  In this Part, I will undertake a brief inquiry into sev-
eral particular aspects of the professional standards of law and his-
tory.  In examining “standards,” I am not referring to the actual 
techniques of historical method or legal practice, of working in the 
archives, canvassing the sources, making causal inferences, and so on.  
Nor am I purporting to offer a comprehensive assessment of the 
norms of the respective professions.  Historical methodology is con-
tested, and historians are notoriously reluctant to describe any defini-
tive set of “standards” for their craft.186  I use the term here to refer to 
the general theoretical orientation of the work that historians and 
lawyers do.  The objectivity/advocacy issue is not new, but it has tre-
mendous relevance to the debates over history in law, given the socio-
logical distinctions discussed above.  For historians, I will analyze the 
longstanding debate over whether “objectivity” is an attainable goal.187  
For lawyers, I examine whether “lawyers’ legal history” should even be 
subject to the standards of professional historiography. 
A. Objectivity: The Historians’ Canon for Discovering Truth 
The critics who assert that there is a tension in making historical 
arguments to interpret legal issues seem to assume that because the 
historian’s professional posture is one of objectivity, historical evi-
dence should not be deployed by those whose role is advocacy.  Ad-
vocacy, they claim, risks distorting the historical record, which, to be 
accurate, requires more explanation of context and a better under-
standing of its differences from our world today than can be provided 
in the situation of a discrete trial or legal controversy.  Advocates, of 
course, seek to marshal favorable evidence in order to persuade, and 
the implications for “objective” historical truth are obvious.  Or, as 
Kalman puts it, “[w]here lawyers focus on text and continuity in or-
der to prescribe, we [historians] concern ourselves with context and 
 186 See Martin, supra note 7, at 1533.  Indeed, the idea that there is any established, 
undisputed methodological canon to which all historians advert is just the kind of 
reductive assumption about their profession that infuriates them. 
 187 See generally NOVICK, supra note 8. 
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change over time with an eye to explaining.”188  Some contend that 
interpreting historical events should be left to those committed to do-
ing so with neutrality, with a solid grounding in the methods of 
weighing various sources, and with no personal stake in the outcome 
of the inquiry.189  The conventional wisdom behind the critique does 
not resolve the matter in favor of exclusion, however, for three rea-
sons: (1) the concept of objectivity in scholarship is open to debate in 
the historical profession itself; (2) historians have, willingly or not, 
increasingly become participants in the culture wars; and (3) recent 
events have shown that history, like any other profession, is subject to 
rare, but serious, cases of academic dishonesty. 
1. Objectivity in Scholarship 
The standard critique of “law office history” proceeds from the 
observation that lawyers, by their very professional orientation, are es-
sentially not objective.  This critique assumes—by implication—that 
historians, to the contrary, are objective in their work.  But historians 
themselves have cast doubt on the very notion of objectivity in their 
own profession.190  What is “objectivity” for a historian?  According to 
historians Paul Conkin and Roland Stromberg, the concept can be 
applied only in a limited context, “when the term ‘objective’ has a 
practical and very restricted meaning” and not as a quest for absolute 
truth: “[i]f it has any bearing on history at all, ‘objectivity’ means that 
the clearly cognitive (truth-claiming) parts of a historical narrative 
must specifically refer to and be inferable from some perceptual evi-
dence of a public sort, and that the cognitive claim must go no fur-
ther.”191  In other words, to be objective, historians must strictly limit 
their interpretations to that which is directly supportable by the evi-
dentiary record as a whole. 
The most well-known account of the troubled relationship of 
American historians to the ideal of objectivity is Peter Novick’s That 
Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profes-
 188 Laura Kalman, The (Un?)Bearable Liteness of E-Mail: Historians, Impeachment and 
Bush v. Gore, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 579, 594 (2003). 
 189 See generally Martin, supra note 7 (arguing that only court-appointed historical 
experts should be permitted in litigation to mitigate concerns over historians testify-
ing on behalf of the parties); see also THOMAS L. HASKELL, OBJECTIVITY IS NOT 
NEUTRALITY (1998). 
 190 See HOFFER, supra note 141. 
 191 PAUL K. CONKIN & ROLAND N. STROMBERG, HERITAGE AND CHALLENGE: THE 
HISTORY AND THEORY OF HISTORY 192 (1989). 
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sion.192  Novick chronicles the professionalization of historiography in 
the U.S. and the longstanding controversy over the profession’s 
norms.193  The first major American historians, such as George Ban-
croft, tended to write celebratory narratives that were esteemed more 
for their didactic value in fostering patriotic virtue than for their his-
torical analysis.194  Then, in the late nineteenth century, armed with 
Ph.D.s from European universities, a new cadre of American histori-
ans began to develop a new professional identity.195  In reacting to the 
overtly patriotic and romantic history of predecessors such as Ban-
croft and Francis Parkman,196 the new American historical profession 
prided itself on its grounding in modern social science techniques 
and standards and its commitment to objectivity—a commitment 
that, according to Novick, would eventually turn out to be only a “no-
ble dream.”197
According to Novick, the idea that historians can practice their 
craft with true objectivity suffered two major assaults in the twentieth 
century.198  First came the post-World War I realization that American 
historians had been guilty of subordinating their principles in sup-
port of nationalist propaganda—in other words, engaging in advo-
cacy.199  And historians from nations on both sides of the War had 
done this, suggesting that perhaps one could not truly transcend the 
biases of one’s nationality, class, or race to write history objectively.200  
In World War II and the early Cold War, the moral certitude of the 
times enabled historians to once again craft a consensus and con-
 192 NOVICK, supra note 8; see also generally MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY & 
OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–
1905 (1975); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM 
SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE (1997); MARK C. SMITH, 
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE CRUCIBLE: THE AMERICAN DEBATE OVER OBJECTIVITY AND 
PURPOSE, 1918–1941 (1994);  OBJECTIVITY, METHOD AND POINT OF VIEW: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (W.J. Van Der Dussen et al. eds., 1991). 
 193 NOVICK, supra note 8, at 1–17. 
 194 E.g., GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM THE 
DISCOVERY OF THE AMERICAN CONTINENT (1899).  Note that the idea that history is im-
portant for its pedagogical value survives today, albeit in vastly different form.  See, 
e.g., Brown, supra note 26, at 181. 
 195 See NOVICK, supra note 8, at 47–60. 
 196 See, e.g., FRANCIS PARKMAN, THE OREGON TRAIL: SKETCHES OF PRAIRIE AND ROCKY-
MOUNTAIN LIFE (Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. 1964) (1849). 
 197 See NOVICK, supra note 8, at 259, 269.  The phrase “that noble dream” comes 
from the title of progressive historian Charles A. Beard’s 1934 seminal essay in the 
American Historical Review, in which he satirized the objectivity ideal.  See Charles A. 
Beard, That Noble Dream, 41 AMER. HIST. REV. 1, 74–87 (1935). 
 198 See NOVICK, supra note 8, at 111,415. 
 199 Id. at 111. 
 200 Id. at 113-16. 
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vince themselves that they were objectively expressing universal prin-
ciples.201  But the upheaval of the 1960s fractured the profession.202  
The methodological orthodoxy of the traditional focus on political 
history was challenged by new schools of historiography such as social 
history and other “new history” movements.  Other disciplines of-
fered postmodernist and critical theory perspectives that attacked the 
very concept of objective truth.  This turmoil left the profession in its 
current state of fragmented agendas and disparate tactics.203
Novick’s account is filled with stories of how individual historians 
have grappled with the possibility that their work, rather than offer-
ing an objective account of history, actually has been tainted by subtle 
bias, if not outright advocacy.204  Novick seems to believe that the very 
ideal of objectivity for the historical profession is now obsolete, but 
not all historians agree.  Thomas L. Haskell instead argues for “con-
tinuing to honor the ideal [of objectivity], meanwhile ridding it of 
unwanted connotations.”205  Haskell believes that a proper amount of 
professional detachment will enable historians to pursue valuable re-
search without unnecessarily fetishizing political “neutrality” on nor-
mative questions.206  We need not decide between Novick’s and Has-
kell’s conceptions of objectivity; it is enough to note for our purposes 
that, within the historical profession itself, there are serious debates 
over whether “objectivity” is something that can or should be 
achieved, and that understanding the context of that debate should 
give us pause before assuming that if we, as lawyers, simply defer any 
judgment on historical issues to members of the historical profession, 
it will automatically resolve the age-old advocacy-vs.-objectivity issue.  
We can see that the historical profession has itself been engaged in a 
struggle to understand these issues. 
It would seem, therefore, that if one moves beyond the standard 
critiques of law office history, one would find that the historical pro-
fession itself is far from having a consensus on the actual achievement 
or applicability of the objectivity ideal.  This does not necessarily 
mean that the asserted “tension” between the underlying values of 
the two professions does not exist, or that historians are not generally 
 201 Id. at 281–82. 
 202 Id. at 415. 
 203 See HOFFER, supra note 141. 
 204 See generally NOVICK, supra note 8. 
 205 See HASKELL, supra note 189, at 148. 
 206 Id. at 150 (“My conception of objectivity (which I believe is widely, if tacitly, 
shared by historians today) is compatible with strong political commitment.”). 
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more oriented toward objectivity than lawyers.207  It does suggest that 
the issue of applying history in law may not be so easily reducible to 
simply positing a fundamental, irreconcilable conflict between objec-
tivity and advocacy.  At any rate, scholars from both professions who 
participate in the debate over history in law are well aware of the 
fraughtness of any claims to objectivity as the sine qua non of profes-
sional history.208  Those who call for leaving history to the historians—
based on historians’ presumably more impartial, dispassionate, objec-
tive stance in interpreting history—should bear in mind the problems 
that the historical profession itself has had with the concept of objec-
tivity. 
2. Scholars as Advocates 
Indeed, many historians themselves might say that the idea that 
they are objective, authoritative arbiters of the meaning of the past is 
an outdated, somewhat romanticized conception of the historical 
profession that went the way of the passenger pigeon with the dis-
placement of postwar “consensus history.”  Since the 1960s historians 
have increasingly become diversified and specialized in their fields of 
study.209  The profession has moved towards concentrating on social 
history, and towards relating the stories of previously oppressed or 
underrepresented groups.210  It has been influenced by and has bor-
rowed from postmodernism, critical theory, and other interdiscipli-
nary currents.  Indeed, historians might be much more likely today to 
conceive of their own scholarly agendas as providing “narratives” of 
certain peoples, groups, or events rather than as attempting to render 
an “objective,” synthetic, comprehensive account. 
Some historians even view their scholarship as being essentially 
“activist” in orientation; even those who do not still find themselves 
participating in political and cultural controversies on occasion.  Pe-
ter Hoffer, in Past Imperfect, has chronicled how in the past generation 
individual historians have participated in such “culture war” issues as 
the debate over Columbus Day, the National History Standards, the 
display of the Enola Gay at the Smithsonian, and the impeachment of 
 207 Reuel Schiller, The Strawhorsemen of the Apocalypse: Relativism and the Historian as 
Expert Witness, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1169, 1169 (1998) (“Reports of objectivity’s demise, at 
least within the historical profession, are premature.”). 
 208 See Rakove, supra note 6, at 1607; see also Farber, supra note 20, at 1010; 
Kramer, supra note 6, at 396; Posner, supra note 1, at 592; Schiller, supra note 207, at 
1169–72; Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 601 
(1995). 
 209 HOFFER, supra note 141, at 15. 
 210 Id. 
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President Clinton.211  Historians furthermore have inserted them-
selves collectively into controversial public policy issues such as im-
peachment and the Bush v. Gore decision by issuing group statements 
expressing opinions purportedly based on their professional exper-
tise.212  Most recently, the American Historical Association—the pri-
mary professional organization for historians of all fields in the 
U.S.—issued a resolution condemning the Iraq War.213
This sort of advocacy regarding hot-button political and cultural 
issues may or may not be agreed upon by all members of the histori-
cal profession, but it should at a minimum disabuse us of the notion 
that historians are necessarily above the fray when it comes to advo-
cating certain points of view to achieve preferred policy outcomes.  
While there is a clear distinction between this sort of advocacy and 
the writing of scholarship, one can just as easily make the same dis-
tinction between lawyers’ advocacy and legal scholarship, or judicial 
opinion-writing.  We are left with the reality that there are different 
ideas and ideologies animating individual members of the historical 
profession, and this may in turn influence historians’ approaches to, 
revisions of, and debates over history and its application.  Thus, the 
idea that lawyers can advert to any source of academic historiography 
as a singular authoritative interpretation of historical meaning may 
itself be a mistaken idea of what the historical profession means to 
provide; it may be a foreign concept to many historians.214
Other scholars have noted the “subjectivization” of professional 
historiography, as successive interpretations seek to challenge and re-
vise previous ones in a polemical dialogue.  Buckner Melton advises 
lawyers to turn to historiography to find support for and weaknesses 
in competing positions.  Melton understands the reality that in most 
disputes either side can be buttressed by historical interpretation, 
noting John Hope Franklin’s assessment that “[i]n virtually every area 
where evidence from the past is needed to support the validity of a 
 211 HOFFER, supra note 148, at 93–130. 
 212 Kalman, supra note 197, at 599 (expressing caution over the seeming ease with 
which historians of all fields signed on to these statements, regardless of whether or 
not they had particular expertise on the issues discussed). 
 213 American Historical Association, Resolution on United States Government Practices 
Inimical to the Values of the Historical Profession, PERSPECTIVES, Feb. 2007, available at 
http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2007/0702/0702aha3.cfm (last vis-
ited March 28, 2008) (The Resolution was approved by a vote of 76 percent to 24 
percent in electronic voting March 1–9, 2007.); see also Scott Jaschik, Historians Vote to 
Condemn War in Iraq, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.insidehighered. 
com/news/2007/03/13/iraq. 
 214 Kalman, supra note 188, at 592 (“Historians appreciate the pastness of the 
past.”). 
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given proposition, an historian can be found who will provide the 
evidence that is needed.’”215  Melton advises lawyers to utilize the 
work of academic historians because, as he quotes Peter Irons, in the 
final analysis, “scholarship is a form of advocacy.”216
3. Academic Dishonesty and Its Implications 
Critics charge that lawyers doing history should adhere to the 
standards of the historical profession or else rely exclusively on pro-
fessional historians.  But while the focus of this critique is toward get-
ting history “right,” relying on historians’ work may not always be a 
failsafe plan.  As certain scandals in recent years have shown, there is 
always the possibility that some historians themselves may not be ap-
plying the rigorous standards demanded by their profession.  Not 
only has objectivity as a goal of historians been questioned, thus 
weakening the argument that academic historians have exclusive pro-
fessional jurisdiction over issuing objective interpretations of the past, 
but the actual practice of certain historians has come under fire too.  
Scandals have erupted over the use or misuse of sources or fabrica-
tion of stories by several prominent historians, including Stephen 
Ambrose, Doris Kearns Goodwin, and Joseph Ellis.217  While these in-
stances of academic dishonesty only involve an infinitesimally small 
proportion of the historical profession, their attendant controversies 
caution us from overreliance on importing expertise from another 
discipline as an automatic panacea for our concern over objectivity. 
The now-paradigmatic example, which has had concrete impli-
cations for constitutional law and social policy, is the familiar case of 
Michael Bellesiles.  His book Arming America: The Origins of a National 
Gun Culture was praised by historians and awarded the 2001 Bancroft 
Prize.218  Bellesiles’s research seemed to indicate that relatively few 
Americans through the late nineteenth century actually owned fire-
arms, and he concluded that the historical evidence does not support 
the myth of a historical American gun culture.219  Current gun-
control debates draw a great deal from competing claims about 
whether the Framers intended that the Second Amendment guaran-
 215 Melton, Jr., supra note 4, at 426 (quoting John Hope Franklin, The Historian 
and the Public Policy, in RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1938–1988 (1992)). 
 216 Id. at 425 (quoting Irons, supra note 4, at 354).
 217 See HOFFER, supra note 141, at viii–ix. 
 218 MICHAEL A. BELLESILES, ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN 
CULTURE (2000). 
 219 Id. 
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tee an individual right to keep and bear arms, or instead only the col-
lective right of States to equip their militias.220
At the time, Bellesiles’s thesis was poised to become the domi-
nant academic paradigm in public discourse over the meaning of the 
Second Amendment and in policy debates over gun control.  Contro-
versial appellate interpretations recently have split the federal circuit 
courts, each opinion relying on historical interpretations of the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment.221  Bellesiles himself 
even signed an amicus brief advocating the collective-rights interpre-
tation as a matter of historical fact in one of the appellate cases.222  
Because Bellesiles’s argument bears directly on a high-profile ques-
tion of constitutional meaning, his work received much publicity.  
That publicity in turn led to intense scrutiny of the evidentiary basis 
for his assertions by groups with a stake in the outcome of the current 
policy debates on which the book touched.223  Critics challenged his 
evidentiary support, including notes that Bellesiles later claimed to 
have lost in an office flood and nineteenth-century California probate 
records that in fact were destroyed in the 1906 San Francisco earth-
quake.224
Despite an initial circling of the wagons around Bellesiles by 
academic historians and Bellesiles’s own response seeming to blame 
the critiques on right-wing gun nuts,225 the critics’ arguments proved 
meritorious and led to further investigations by scholars.  Eventually, 
 220 SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA (2006); see also Sanford Levinson, The Embar-
rassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989). 
 221 See Parker v. District of Columbia, 438 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding, 
based partly on historical analysis, that the Second Amendment guarantees both a 
collective and an individual right to bear arms), cert. granted, sub nom. District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (U.S. Nov. 20, 2007) (No. 07-290); Silveria v. 
Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding, based partly on historical analysis, 
that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right to bear arms, 
but rather only that the of the States to collectively arm their militias), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 803 (2003); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (hold-
ing, based partly on historical analysis, that the Second Amendment guarantees both 
a collective and an individual right to bear arms ). 
 222 Brief for Ad Hoc Group of Law Professors and Historians as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Appellant (the “Yassky Brief”), United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (No. 99-10331). 
 223 See Michael A. Bellesiles, Disarming the Critics, NEWS. OF THE ORG. OF AM. 
HISTORIANS, Nov. 2001, available at http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2001nov/bellesiles. 
html (responding to criticisms of his methodology). 
 224 James Lindgren, Fall From Grace: Arming America and the Bellesiles Scandal, 111 
YALE L.J. 2195, 2230 n.206 (2002); James Lindgren & Justin L. Heather, Counting 
Guns in Early America, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1777, 1826 (2002). 
 225 Bellesiles, supra note 223. 
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Bellesiles’s employer, Emory University, retained a panel of eminent 
historians to investigate the allegations, and while their report 
stopped short of finding intentional fraud, it was clear that Bellesiles 
had unacceptably deviated from professional norms in producing 
scholarship that could not be supported by any reliable evidence.226  
His Bancroft Prize was subsequently revoked,227 and Bellesiles eventu-
ally resigned his position at Emory.228  One wonders if the desire to 
prove the correctness of his theory and the high political stakes of the 
question led Bellesiles to abandon the historian’s fidelity to facts and 
evidence. 
It is worth noting that the reason Emory had to rely on an ad 
hoc panel was that the American Historical Association had gotten 
out of the business of policing academic dishonesty among historians 
shortly before the Bellesiles scandal broke.229  However, the ad hoc 
panel approach worked not only for Emory, but also for the Univer-
sity of Colorado when controversial ethnic studies professor Ward 
Churchill came under fire for his alleged plagiarism, falsification, and 
fabrication in his scholarship after his criticisms of victims of the Sep-
tember 11th attacks achieved notoriety.230
The Bellesiles scandal rocked the historical profession, and 
rightly so.  Because the work of nearly all historians is above reproach 
in terms of ethics, historians rightly felt that Bellesiles’s fraud under-
mined the integrity of the profession.  The scandal plays a necessary 
part in this discussion not to impugn historians’ scholarship but 
rather to remind us that in any legal context, relying on one source 
 226 REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE COMM. IN THE MATTER OF PROFESSOR MICHAEL 
BELLESILES (2002), http://www.news.emory.edu/Releases/Final_Report.pdf.  The 
distinguished historians on the panel were Stanley Katz, Janna Gray, and Laurel 
Thatcher Ulrich.  Id. 
 227 Announcement by the Columbia University Board of Trustees (Dec. 13, 2002), 
available at http://hnn.us/articles/1157.html (announcing the revocation of Belle-
siles’s Bancroft Prize). 
 228 News Release, Emory University, Michael Bellesiles Resigns from Emory Fac-
ulty, (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.news.emory.edu/Releases/bellesiles 
1035563546.html. 
 229 HOFFER, supra note 141, at 165, 238–39. 
 230 REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. ON RESEARCH 
MISCONDUCT AT THE UNIV. OF COLORADO AT BOULDER CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF 
ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT AGAINST PROFESSOR WARD CHURCHILL (2006), available at: 
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/churchillreport051606.html.  
The investigative committee found unanimously that Churchill committed “serious 
research misconduct,” but split as to whether termination or suspension was the 
more appropriate sanction.  Id.  The University fired Churchill on July 24, 2007.  See 
Berny Morson, CU Regents Fire Churchill, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 25, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2007/jul/25/cu-regents-fire-ward 
-churchill/. 
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alone, without “cross-examining” that source through the ventilation 
of opposing accounts or interpretations, bears risks.  We continue to 
expect historians to produce accurate and reliable interpretations of 
the past.  On the whole, historians are indeed best equipped to assess 
evidence and make inferences as to causation and meaning of his-
torical information.  But as with the objectivity question, it may be too 
simplistic to assert that by definition historians are objective and get 
history right, while lawyers are mere advocates and only manipulate 
history to serve their partisan ends. 
B. Advocacy: The Law’s Process for Determining Truth 
The professional standards of practicing lawyers regarding their 
posture toward a given legal issue, on the other hand, are fairly easy 
and straightforward to describe: in general, lawyers who represent 
clients in legal controversies are duty-bound to act as advocates for 
the clients’ interests.231  And we should not want it any other way.  In-
deed, the lawyers’ duty is often referred to as one of “zealous advo-
cacy.”232  However, despite the duty of advocacy, lawyers are con-
strained by certain ethical standards that require their work product 
to meet a minimum threshold of truth and reliability.  A lawyer may 
not distort the evidentiary record; may not make claims that are fac-
tually untrue; may not make frivolous claims; and may not ignore evi-
dence that is damaging to his client’s position.233  Thus, while lawyers 
are engaged in advocacy, by their own professional standards lawyers 
are no less obligated to adhere to the truth and to respect the evi-
dence than are historians.  Lawyers are thus in theory no more enti-
tled to distort or abuse historical evidence, or make unsupportable 
historical claims, than are historians. 
In reality, of course, no sane observer would argue that most in-
dividual lawyers prioritize reaching the abstract truth, except perhaps 
at a systemic level, than they do about competently representing their 
clients’ interests.  The nature of the adversary process and the profes-
sional obligation to serve their clients can seem to be the dominant 
forces influencing lawyers’ conduct.  But a refresher in professional 
ethics reminds us that lawyers are indeed obligated to serve the larger 
 231 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (1998) (“The advocate has a 
duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause . . . .”). 
 232 See, e.g., Shannan E. Higgins, Note, Ethical Rules of Lawyering: An Analysis of Role-
based Reasoning from Zealous Advocacy to Purposivism, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639 
(1999).  We should rightly be more concerned if historians characterized the bases of 
their particular historical interpretations as driven by “zeal.” 
 233 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 3.3 (1998). 
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ends of the legal system, which demands respect for evidence and 
procedural standards and does not allow for arguments that are flatly 
untrue.  At least in theory, lawyers could be subject to court sanctions 
under most court rules234 and to professional bar discipline under the 
various state bar rules of professional conduct for improper treat-
ment of historical evidence.235  I freely acknowledge that a profes-
sional disciplinary action against a lawyer for “misusing” history would 
be extremely unlikely to happen (in fact, I have found no such cases).  
The problem is that the scope of the rules is intentionally broad, and 
the range of “acceptable” historical assertions is practically limitless.  
But a reminder that a lawyer’s abuse of evidence—historical or oth-
erwise—is just as unethical as a historian’s, and is specifically prohib-
ited by ethical rules, serves the purpose of putting the question of 
professional jurisdiction to use history in a broader context. 
The role of judges and courts (and, secondarily, of legal schol-
ars) is more compelling.  Are judges, unlike the parties and their ad-
vocates, more “objective”?  The court system’s assignment of the ad-
versarial roles to the attorneys is designed to produce between them 
the legal approximation of “truth” in the courtroom.  Are judges—
who are so often the subject of criticism for the way in which they use 
history in deciding cases—more like impartial arbiters of the inter-
pretation of historical fact, in the sense that historians are supposed 
to be impartial?  Probably so.  In general, both judges and historians 
are charged with the responsibility of reviewing the factual record in 
its entirety, of weighing all of the evidence, and of rendering an in-
terpretation of the “truth” as accurately as possible.  In fact the com-
parison between the role of the historian and that of the judge “has 
had a lasting life,” according to eminent historiographer Carlo 
Ginzburg.236  Ginzburg acknowledges that the roles have much in 
common: “[w]e can conclude, therefore, that the tasks of both the 
historian and the judge imply the ability to demonstrate, according to 
specific rules, that x did y . . . .” while noting that in the end, “histori-
 234 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring truthfulness by attorneys in making represen-
tations to court in pleadings); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (providing for sanctions against at-
torneys who fail to cooperate in discovery—i.e., the process by which both sides 
gather evidence to support arguments about truth). 
 235 See, e.g., TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.01 (requiring attorneys to make only 
meritorious claims and contentions); TEX. DISC. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.03 (requiring 
candor toward the tribunal). 
 236 Carlo Ginzburg, Checking the Evidence: The Judge and the Historian, in QUESTIONS 
OF EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 290, 291 
(James Chandler et al. eds., 1994) (citing historian-judge comparisons dating back to 
Henri Griffet in 1769 and Hegel). 
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ans and judges traditionally have had widely divergent aims.”237 Does 
this qualified similarity mean, then, that judges ought to be allowed 
to “do” history, since they are institutionally free to consider history 
objectively?  That is a tougher question.  Having a neutral posture is 
only half of the problem.  The other half is the contention, pointed 
out by Professor Rakove and others, that judges are not trained in the 
methods of professional historians.238
Some prominent commentators argue, however, that we should 
not prevent judges, or for that matter, legal scholars, or even practic-
ing lawyers, from engaging in historical analysis merely because they 
are not experienced in the professional standards of academic histo-
riography.  Mark Tushnet and Cass Sunstein, in advocating civic re-
publicanism as an aspirational interpretive theory, have argued that 
the historical accounts written by lawyers have fundamentally differ-
ent purposes from those of the professional historians and should not 
be held to the same standards.239  Nor must they necessarily be 
sneered at as inferior “law office history” or “history lite.”240  This is 
because “the historian and the constitutional lawyer have legitimately 
different roles . . . and what a constitutional lawyer finds from history 
may, for legitimately different reasons relating to that purpose and 
role, be quite different from what a historian finds there.”241
For Sunstein, the lawyer’s role is to make “the best constructive 
sense out of historical events” in order to provide a “useable past.”242  
Tushnet agrees that the purposes of what he calls “history-in-law” are 
not the same as those of academic history.  Rather than give us actual 
information about the past or provide determinative authority, “law-
yers’ history” is intended to shed light on how we think about legal 
issues.  Under this reasoning, calls to require the professional “stan-
dards” of historians when lawyers engage in historical inquiry are 
misplaced: “[l]aw-office history is a legal practice, not a historical 
one.”243  And from the conservative side of the spectrum, even Judge 
Posner seems to agree that, because the use of history in interpreting 
legal issues (in the limited universe of cases where he would find it 
acceptable) has a fundamentally different purpose than that of aca-
 237 Id. at 295–96. 
 238 Rakove, supra note 6, at 1588 (noting that “there is good historical evidence 
that jurists rarely make good historians” (citing the work of Charles A. Miller, Leo-
nard W. Levy, and William E. Nelson)). 
 239 Sunstein, supra note 208; Tushnet, supra note 158. 
 240 Sunstein, supra note 208, at 603. 
 241 Id. at 602. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Tushnet, supra note 158, at 934. 
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demic history, the same standards should not be required.244  Finally, 
from the ranks of the historians, Kalman—while steadfastly refusing 
to allow any compromise on requiring the maximum amount of 
methodological rigor possible—also agrees that “lawyers’ legal his-
tory” is a different enterprise, with different purposes, than “histori-
ans’ legal history.” 
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR USING HISTORY  
RESPONSIBLY IN LAW 
The foregoing has shown that while the use of historical argu-
ments or evidence is often criticized for normative and methodologi-
cal reasons, lawyers of various ideological persuasions rely on history 
more than ever.  In attempting to strike a balanced approach to 
evaluating methodological questions when lawyers “do history,” it is 
useful to examine the phenomenon in terms of the dialogues over 
disciplinary and professional standards.  The debates over the appro-
priateness of judges, attorneys, and legal scholars using historical 
analysis cannot be easily resolved, but—as the adversarial process it-
self fleshes out truth through the airing of competing views—the de-
bates over history in law can help us understand the central issues. 
In this Part, I examine some of the possible practical measures 
through which the problems inherent in using history in legal inter-
pretation might be addressed.  While many of these measures have 
been suggested by others, in practice most have proven unrealistic.  
Adding historians or a level of systemic professional historical review 
to the legal system would interfere with the prerogatives of the advo-
cates.  But this discussion helps us understand how the professional 
standards of historians could theoretically be applied across jurisdic-
tional lines to the law.  In the final analysis, the best, most usable 
framework for incorporating minimum standards of historical reli-
ability in the law already exists in the form of evidence law and the-
ory.  Greater attention to the rules of evidence will improve how his-
tory is used in court, and legal scholars studying history can profit 
from thinking in terms of evidence law as well. 
A. Institutional Solutions 
1. Historical Expertise on the Courts 
One of the potential solutions is to create some sort of formal 
mechanism for the participation of professional historians in the 
 244 Posner, supra note 1. 
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court systems.  Possibilities include employing official court historians 
or special courts to decide historical questions.  These institutional 
solutions are purely theoretical; any such attempt would require fun-
damental changes to our judicial system such that it would be highly 
unlikely that they would ever be implemented.  But it is a useful 
thought exercise for considering the theoretical problems of history 
in law in light of the practical realities.  In trying to flesh out some 
pragmatic middle ground in the debate over applying historical stan-
dards to legal interpretation, it is worth considering these ideas. 
Leonard Levy suggested the establishment of an official Office of 
Supreme Court Historian.245  Professor Levy was long known as one of 
the harshest critics of the Supreme Court’s use of history.246  He sug-
gested the idea of employing an official historian in his foundational 
Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution.247  Though unrealistic as a 
practical matter, it is an interesting idea coming from one of the most 
prominent American constitutional historians.  The benefit of this in-
stitution would presumably be the ability of the Justices to consult the 
advice of a professional historian steeped in the standards and meth-
odological norms of academic history.  This could result in “better” 
judicial history (measured against professional historiography) enter-
ing the volumes of the Supreme Court Reporter.  But there are po-
tential drawbacks as well. 
First of all, one might question whether it is desirable for the 
Supreme Court’s historical interpretations to gain even more legiti-
macy than they already have.  One of the leading concerns about the 
Justices’ historical interpretations is that the version of history set 
forth in a Court opinion attains a degree of official authoritativeness.  
The very presence of an official Historian on the Court’s staff would 
imply that the historical pronouncements of the Justices bear the 
stamp of professional approval by a historian, and thus could become 
even more authoritative than they currently are.  Given the problems 
discussed above, do we really want the Court’s version of history to 
seem even more authoritative?  The Court’s jurisprudence of the 
First, Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments, to name just a 
 245 LEVY, supra note 11.  Note that Levy’s suggested Court Historian was not in-
tended to be like other governmental in-house historians who do research on the 
institutions where they are lodged.  Levy’s Supreme Court Historian would actively 
participate in the business of the Court by evaluating historical arguments made in 
actual cases and providing historical advice to the Justices. 
 246 See Gordon Morris Bakken, The Promise of American History in Law, 24 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 277, 285 (1988) (“Levy . . . deplores the uses of history by the Supreme Court 
leading to disastrous ends.”). 
 247 LEVY, supra note 11. 
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few, has produced enough quasi-authoritative “history” as to give ad-
vocates of either side of any issue ample fodder for their arguments.  
The same is the case with structural constitutional questions such as 
sovereign immunity or federalism.  Especially for those critics uncom-
fortable with the use of history by the courts, there is good reason to 
hesitate at the prospect of an even weightier imprimatur being lent to 
the description of “Framers’ intent” by a Justice Black or a Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist or a Justice Souter resulting from their ability to run 
their opinion drafts by an official Court Historian (or not).248
Nor would the presence of a Court Historian resolve controver-
sies over whether the Eighth Amendment was meant to fix the mean-
ing of “cruel and unusual” by the standards of 1789 or according to 
“evolving standards of decency”; nor whether the Second Amend-
ment was meant to protect an individual or a collective right.  These 
issues in the contemporary debates have a purpose that has more to 
do with our collective memory of constitutional meaning than with 
specific historical interpretations of discrete provisions based on evi-
dence.  Moreover, they are so entwined with contemporary issues in 
the culture wars that any perceived input from a Court Historian 
would be unsatisfactory to one side and would only draw greater at-
tention to the potential for partisan influence in scholarship.  Putting 
a historian on the staff of the Court could even undermine the le-
gitimacy of the historical profession in the public’s eyes by seeming to 
place the profession in the service of reaching particular contempo-
rary policy outcomes, thus compromising the very objectivity that 
might make it seem at first glance like a helpful idea. 
Furthermore, having an official historian on the staff would not 
likely push the Justices to undertake any more of a rigorous, meth-
odological approach to consulting history.  Many Justices might think 
they understand history without the aid of a consultant.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist authored several books on legal history during his ten-
ure.249  Does anyone really think that a Justice Scalia or a Justice 
 248 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971–76 (1997) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (stating that his historical view of The Federalist controlled his decision); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the leaders of the founding generation intended a closer relationship between relig-
ion and government); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (Black, J.) (de-
claring that the Framers established a “wall of separation between Church and 
State”).  
 249 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME (1998); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION 
OF 1876 (2004); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENT 
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992).  As of this writing, 
Chief Justice Roberts has not appeared to show much of a historical bent in his opin-
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Souter—to take two Justices who often make historical inquiries in 
their opinions—would call the Court Historian into his office and say, 
“I have absolutely no idea what the founders thought about issue X.  
Can you help me consult the historical evidence?”  Of course not.  
The legal realists among us would likely suspect that judges get a 
rough sense of how to decide the case first, and only thereafter do 
they review historical or other evidence to help construct a persua-
sive, well-reasoned opinion.  And this highlights one of the underly-
ing tensions we have identified with using history in law: the different 
purposes for which lawyers and historians use evidence.  Finally, this 
proposal would do little to rebut the critique of professional history 
itself as a less than purely objective endeavor, at best, or subordinated 
to political or polemical goals at worst.  Would a conservative Justice 
rely on the input of a liberal historian, or vice versa? 
Adrian Vermeule has recently suggested that we consider the 
idea of “lay Justices,” that is, the appointment of Supreme Court Jus-
tices who are not lawyers.250  Vermeule argues that it would enable the 
Court to have Justices with expertise in fields other than law—
including history.251  This argument takes Levy one better by offering 
the possibility of one or more historians not just on the Court’s staff, 
but as voting (and, perhaps more importantly for our discussion, 
opinion-writing) members of the Court itself.  Of course, Vermeule 
does not expect this to happen, but it is a useful exercise in how to 
think about bringing historical expertise to bear on legal questions at 
the highest level.252
Another structural possibility, in theory, is the establishment of 
special courts or special judges to decide questions of historical 
meaning, presumably staffed by judges with more expertise in law 
and history.  While American courts are mostly general-purpose 
courts, or divided only broadly into criminal and civil dockets, we do 
have some courts with special functions that allow the judges to de-
velop expertise in the subject matter.  Bankruptcy courts, family 
courts, and the Court of Federal Claims are examples of courts that 
have jurisdiction over cases that present certain types of issues.  Even 
ions—in fact he may take a more limited approach toward applying external evi-
dence than his predecessor and former mentor—but it was also well publicized dur-
ing his confirmation hearings that he won prizes for his work as a history major at 
Harvard.  See John G. Roberts, Jr., http://www.oyez.org/justices/john_g_roberts_jr/ 
(last visited March 28, 2008). 
 250 Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569 (2007). 
 251 Id. at 1570 (“[I]t would be a good idea . . . to appoint a historian, economist, 
doctor, accountant, soldier, or some other nonlawyer professional to the Court.”). 
 252 Id. 
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if there are other issues in a given case, the specialty court hears the 
entire case based on the specialty subject matter at issue.  And there 
is a recent trend among the states to develop more special courts to 
hear specific types of cases.  However, having specialty courts that 
deal with particular questions tends to be a more regular feature of 
inquisitorial court systems found in other countries.  Because the es-
tablishment of special courts to determine historical meaning would 
fundamentally tamper with the existing court structure and is, at any 
rate, completely theoretical, I will not discuss it in detail except to 
note that the benefits and drawbacks would be analogous to those as-
sociated with Levy’s suggestion.  But the logic behind this idea is valid 
and prompts a comparative review of inquisitorial or civil law sys-
tems.253
Finally, there is one other possibility for providing judges with 
historical expertise: the appointment by courts (rather than by the 
parties) of historical expert witnesses to testify in specific cases.  This 
idea, while the most realistic, still leaves the judge and the historian 
susceptible to many of the controversies discussed above, and is in the 
final analysis unsatisfying.  It will be discussed in greater detail below. 
2. Comparative Law and Pragmatic Truth 
Another aspect of the conventional critique of history in law is 
that the adversarial nature of the legal process results in a less-than-
complete picture of actual historical truth.  What if our legal system 
was less adversarial and more like the inquisitorial systems that some 
European countries employ?  If litigation was driven less by the par-
ties and a stronger role was given to the courts in ferreting out and 
establishing facts and evaluating evidence, we might get to a more ac-
curate picture of historical truth.  If the adversarial nature of the 
American legal process is the problem, a brief comparison with other 
judicial systems will be instructive. 
The difference between our American judicial system and cer-
tain civil law systems in how they might approach historical evidence 
is twofold.  First, as Judge Posner points out, adjudicating the com-
mon law is by definition more past-dependent than construing a code 
because the common law depends on interpreting the legal prece-
dent as it has evolved over time and resolving legal issues according 
to stare decisis.  This is consonant with the finding by Lee Epstein 
and others that the average age of judges is much higher in the 
 253 See supra Part IV. 
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United States than in most European legal systems.254  As Judge Pos-
ner notes, while this is partly because in those systems judgeship is a 
separate career track that lawyers enter at an early stage, it also might 
implicitly reflect the intuition in the U.S. that older judges, due to the 
breadth and depth of their experience, may be much better able to 
have a perspicacious understanding of the array of sources that can 
influence common-law judging, including history and precedent.255
Matthew King examines another comparative difference be-
tween the U.S. and other legal systems that has potential implications 
for interpreting history in law: their different understandings of 
“truth.”256  Inquisitorial systems, according to King, engage in a “teleo-
logical” quest for “absolute Truth.”257  As discussed above, the Ameri-
can court system is structurally designed to get at the best under-
standing of truth through the adversarial process.258  King refers to 
this as “pragmatic truth.”259  The two systems differ in how they use 
and regulate evidence.  In comparing how the two systems treat evi-
dence that was illegally obtained, King finds that exclusionary rules 
operate as key elements in adversarial systems but are less emphasized 
in inquisitorial systems.260  Because adversarial systems such as ours 
ultimately favor certain rights and values over absolute truth, our 
courts are willing to accept for decisional purposes a version of truth 
that they know is less than factually accurate or complete.261
Our evidence regime therefore mediates between fact and law: 
between absolute factual truth and external legal concerns.  The clas-
sic example of how American courts can favor systemic concerns for 
rights over absolute truth is the exclusionary rule.  If a defendant’s 
guilt in a crime, while real in fact, can be established in court only by 
evidence that was obtained illegally, the use of that evidence will not 
be allowed.  Suppose a defendant had actually committed a murder, 
but the only evidence for the prosecution was a handgun obtained in 
a warrantless search of the defendant’s home, in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.262  An American court would find a constitu-
tional violation and not allow the evidence to be used. 
 254 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 22–24 (2001). 
 255 Posner, supra note 1, at 593. 
 256 King, supra note 21, at 187. 
 257 Id. at 187–88. 
 258 See supra note 254 and accompanying text. 
 259 King, supra note 21, at 189. 
 260 Id. at 191–92. 
 261 Id. 
 262 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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In inquisitorial systems, however, the application of exclusionary 
rules is rare.  The court’s main priority is to reconstruct an accurate, 
objective account of the Truth.263  The inquisitorial court could re-
main free to consider the illegally-obtained handgun.  Individual 
procedural rights are subordinated to the actual truth of innocence 
or guilt.  While in the U.S. the court would be barred from consider-
ing the illegally-obtained handgun, an inquisitorial court could allow 
the evidence if it assisted in reconstructing the truth of past events.264  
In the U.S., a defendant can be acquitted despite the existence of il-
legally-obtained, but excluded, evidence that establishes actual guilt 
in fact. 
American courts, therefore, are willing to settle for something 
less than perfect accuracy in declaring a legally binding interpreta-
tion of events, due to our commitment to systemic and procedural 
values which we think override the need for absolute truth.  This 
would seem to support the contentions of Tushnet, Sunstein, and 
others that the rigorous methodological standards of historians might 
not be appropriate for legal consultation of history.265  Legal inquiry 
might have a fundamentally different purpose: to construct the best 
working version of “truth” as it can under the circumstances in order 
to interpret the legal issues properly at hand. 
An analogous concept can be borrowed from basic tort law.  In 
tort, the law instructs the court to draw a line where we are willing to 
assign liability for acts that caused damage.  To find that a given fac-
tor is the proximate cause for the injury requires a higher standard of 
culpability than mere causation-in-fact.266  As we know, sometimes a 
factor that actually caused an injury is deemed by the law to be too at-
tenuated to assign blame to a party.  The classic torts case Palsgraf v. 
Long Island Railroad Co. illustrates the difference between what actu-
ally caused an event in fact and what the law will accept as legal causa-
tion for use in determining legal questions.267  In Palsgraf, as any first-
year torts student knows, the railroad company’s employee actually 
caused the damage to plaintiff by pushing another passenger onto 
the moving train.268  But the company was held not liable because it 
 263 King, supra note 21, at 187. 
 264 Id. 
 265 See supra notes 158–59, 239–43. 
 266 See ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES AND 
PROBLEMS 242 (2d. ed. 2007) (“A torts plaintiff must do more than show that a de-
fendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s harm.  The plaintiff must also 
satisfy the requirement of proximate cause.”). 
 267 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 268 Id. at 340–41. 
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was not a foreseeable risk that the passenger was carrying a package 
of fireworks that when he fell would explode and knock over scales at 
the far end of the platform, which would in turn fall on the plain-
tiff.269  In other words, the actual truth of what caused the accident 
was not enough to assign fault as the “proximate” true cause under 
the law. 
Historians, too, weigh evidence and make causal inferences to 
explain historical phenomena.  But the legal determination that an 
act is not the “proximate cause” of an injury that it nonetheless actu-
ally caused is a legal fiction, a line-drawing exercise in accord with a 
higher principle (i.e., that liability should not fall on those who do 
not breach a duty to avoid foreseeable risk),270 that the historian is 
not called on to perform.  Historical truth is not so much subordi-
nated in the legal process as it is expected to be working in unison 
with other rules and norms that constrain the courts and govern the 
resolution of the actual cases.  It is therefore easy to understand why 
historians can be so unsatisfied with the historical interpretations 
made by courts in litigation. 
My purpose here is not to defend any sort of watered-down ver-
sion of historical truth, no matter how poorly done, as “good enough 
for government work.”  But it must be kept in mind that our justice 
system holds certain values—especially those individual procedural 
rights guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions—to be more 
important than the determination of factual certitude.271  This is not 
the same as willful blindness to the truth.  Indeed, as the classic ex-
ample of the exclusionary rule shows, the judge and the parties—and 
in some cases the public at large—know exactly what the illegally-
obtained evidence is and what it purports to show.272  Despite some 
cases where we know a defendant is in fact guilty of the crime, we 
nonetheless exclude the evidence necessary to convict.  Similarly, 
sometimes we refuse to assign tort liability for an act that we know ac-
tually caused an injury in fact.273  But this does not mean the truth is 
not known; it is simply deemed to be outside the decisional parame-
ters of the issues before the court.  The historical truth is thus often on 
 269 Id. at 340–47. 
 270 PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 281 (William Lloyd Prosser et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984). 
 271 U.S. CONST. amends. IV–VIII. 
 272 See, e.g., People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (noting, 
in famously rejecting the exclusionary rule, that the rule would provide that “[t]he 
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.”). 
 273 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
FESTA_FINAL 3/30/2008  1:54:21 PM 
2008] APPLYING A USABLE PAST 535 
 
the record, even though it is not considered determinative in resolv-
ing the case at bar. 
B. Evaluating Law by Historians’ Standards: Translational Solutions 
Returning to the critical view for the moment—the argument 
that lawyers engaging historical evidence should indeed be required 
to apply the professional standards of academic historians—the prac-
tical question remains: given that most lawyers lack formal training in 
history, how can we achieve the effective translation of the standards 
of one profession to another?  There is a certain myth that lawyers 
are sort of junior-varsity historians, or that a substantial percentage of 
lawyers were undergraduate majors in history and thus might be pre-
pared for the challenge.274  One scholar’s informal review indicates, 
however, that less than ten percent of current law students actually 
majored in history, a percentage too small for us to rely on comforta-
bly to show any significant level of historical training across the legal 
profession.275  But the larger point is that an undergraduate educa-
tional background would not by itself qualify a lawyer to authorita-
tively engage in professional historiography.276
Perhaps increasing the amount of legal history taught at Ameri-
can law schools would help.  But this is not practically possible—
curricular demands are many and resources often stretched; fur-
thermore, law schools do not require students to take a course in le-
gal history because for most students the essence of legal education is 
learning the ability to practice the law as it is today (at the behest of 
clients who generally do not care to pay lawyers’ hourly rates to learn 
the complex historical reasons why they can or cannot take some 
practical action under the current law).277  And even if more legal his-
tory was taught, many legal history courses cover only narrow topical 
areas, and even fewer provide thorough grounding in graduate-level 
historical methodology.  It is far from certain that a few extra legal 
history offerings would have any effect toward producing a genera-
tion of lawyers steeped in the norms of professional historiography. 
 274 See Chief Justice Randall, Foreword—The Importance of History to Modern Lawyer-
ing, 68 IND. L.J. (1993). 
 275 Melton, supra note 4, at 386 n.41 (determining that during a given period, less 
than ten percent of incoming law students at the University of North Carolina Law 
School were undergraduate history majors, and concluding that this percentage is 
too small to generalize any academic historical competency across the legal profes-
sion). 
 276 Flaherty, supra note 3, at 526. 
 277 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Courts, Legislature and History: Having Faith in Time, 27 
CUMB. L. REV. 941, 942 (1996). 
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A more likely scenario is the one discussed at various points 
above,278 that of directly appealing to lawyers and judges who consult 
history to learn about and apply the standards of professional histori-
ans to the best extent possible.  While the majority of commentators 
usually arrive at this suggestion as a concluding thought when at-
tempting to reconcile the normative question of using history in law, 
at least two scholars have written to provide practical advice to lawyers 
on the effective and appropriate ways to use history—though with de-
cidedly different attitudes. 
In one of the leading articles from the height of the controversy 
over originalism, H. Jefferson Powell attempts to prescribe “Rules for 
Originalists.”279  Of course Powell, who made one of the first and most 
famous critiques of originalism as a normative enterprise,280 offered 
this purported “rulebook” tongue-in-cheek.  But after going through 
his litany of rules, lecturing would-be originalists on points from 
“[h]istory itself will not prove anything nonhistorical,” to “[h]istory 
never obviates the necessity of choice,”281 Powell indicates that his his-
torical standards are not meant simply to debunk originalism, but 
also are a serious way of understanding the proper approach to his-
torical inquiry.  He concludes that there is a legitimate role for con-
sulting history in interpreting the Constitution, but only when lawyers 
go about it with the close attention to the norms and limits of the his-
torical method he prescribes.282
Buckner Melton better accommodates the reality that history is 
and will be used in legal arguments.  He provides a more practical, 
user-oriented aid for lawyers attempting to grapple with historical 
method in his article Clio at the Bar: A Guide to Historical Method for 
Legists and Jurists.283  Melton does not weigh in on the normative de-
bates.  He writes for the lawyer or judge who is faced with the practi-
cal reality of having to marshal evidence in support of legal argu-
ments.284  Accepting the fact that history has become an increasingly 
important factor in legal interpretation, Melton attempts to provide 
the practitioner with a usable guide to historical method.285  He offers 
a summary of historical method and its potential applications, an in-
 278 See supra Part V.A. 
 279 Powell, supra note 12. 
 280 Powell, supra note 35. 
 281 Powell, supra note 12, at 662–91. 
 282 Id. at 695. 
 283 Melton, supra note 4. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. at 381–83. 
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troduction to historiography and its potential uses for lawyers, and an 
extended review of historical standards for locating and evaluating 
sources and making causal inferences.286  In short, Melton’s Clio at the 
Bar is the most sophisticated and successful attempt to undertake the 
nuts-and-bolts effort, suggested by others, at translating the methodo-
logical standards of professional history to the practicing legal com-
munity.  By focusing on lawyers and judges, rather than on scholars 
and theorists, as his intended audience, Melton has also taken the 
approach that has the greatest potential to reassure the historical 
profession that its standards can be observed even in the context of 
adversarial litigation.287
The bottom line is that it is probably unrealistic and impractical 
to expect lawyers and judges to meet the standards of academic histo-
rians and produce professional-quality historiography.288  I heartily 
endorse the notion that lawyers should strive to approximate these 
standards as an aspiration.289  It will not always happen, but we can 
hope for incremental improvements.  Indeed, the interdisciplinary 
application of history by legal scholars may have improved over the 
last generation.290  More importantly, we must keep in mind that the 
legal process requires expertise from many different fields other than 
history—fields with which lawyers and judges have as little or less ex-
perience than they do with history.  Yet we do not banish categori-
cally all evidence that relates to other fields just because the lawyers 
are not experts.  Instead, we apply legal standards to review and 
evaluate that evidence.  This can be done with history, too. 
C. Evaluating History by Lawyers’ Standards: The Law of Evidence 
This Article, like most of the commentary and debate over the 
use of history in legal and constitutional interpretation, has focused 
on the question of conforming legal inquiries in history to the profes-
sional standards of historians.  This focus is entirely appropriate be-
cause precisely what gives observers pause is the perception that un-
trained lawyers and judges are constructing historical interpretations 
that do violence to the actual historical record painstakingly crafted 
by professional historians.  Yet it is also possible to ask the converse 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Kramer, supra note 6, at 391. 
 289 Landau, supra note 124, at 486 (arguing that “judges who turn to history must 
commit themselves to doing it right”). 
 290 KALMAN, supra note 3, at 224. 
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question: do the standards of the law offer anything that might help 
reconcile the legal use of history with the concerns of historians? 
The use of history in law is at bottom a question of evidence.  
And there is one set of basic procedural rules which governs litigation 
and already operates—at least in theory—to allow for the review of 
historical arguments according to the professional standards of his-
tory: the law and rules of evidence.291  The Federal Rules of Evidence 
and the generally similar state evidence codes provide the framework 
for (impartial) judges to assess the admissibility and relevance of the 
evidence offered by the (adversarial) parties to litigation.292  I con-
tend that the rigorous application of the evidence rules to scrutinize 
proffered historical evidence can mitigate some of the methodologi-
cal concerns that the commentators have expressed.  This will admit-
tedly affect only a subset of the areas in which historical inquiry has 
been identified as problematic: namely, court cases at the trial level 
where specific historical issues are being litigated and specific histori-
cal evidence is being offered. 
Yet it is precisely this setting—the trial courtroom—where his-
tory-in-law is the most troubling and has the potential to set on the 
record an erroneous but authoritative interpretation of historical 
fact.  And given the traditional appellate deference towards a trial 
court’s findings of fact,293 getting the story right at that level is ex-
tremely important.  Legal scholars can also profit from extra atten-
tion to the canons of evidence law when exploring the past.  I am not 
claiming that the rules of evidence will solve all the problems of his-
tory in law, especially in the highly controversial cases that command 
public attention.  But in an area of such well-worn debate, incre-
mental improvements can be very helpful.  Evidence law gives us a 
framework for understanding how history can work within the pa-
rameters of the legal system to provide useful information for solving 
cases, while maintaining reliability under the standards of the histori-
cal profession. 
 291 While each state has its own law of evidence, the majority of states conform to 
the Model Rules of Evidence, which are similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
Since constitutional litigation is a federal issue and will likely end up in federal court, 
the Federal Rules will be discussed for the purposes of this paper. 
 292 FED. R. EVID. art. IV (“Relevancy and its Limits”). 
 293 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (stating that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law”). 
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1. Historical Evidence and Relevance 
Another facet of the critique of history in law is that in the litiga-
tion process, historical arguments may seem to draw attention away 
from the central issues in the contemporary dispute.294  But historical 
evidence, like any other kind of evidence, must be judged relevant to 
be admitted.  Article IV of the Federal Rules pertains to relevancy.295  
To consider its possible application to historical evidence, the logic of 
the Rules is simple.  Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of con-
sequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.”296  Rule 402 man-
dates that all relevant evidence is admissible to be heard by the court 
and that all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.297
A judge, then, has the authority to question the relevance of of-
fered historical evidence, and if she determines that it does not have 
any relation to facts bearing on the elements of the proponent’s case, 
that evidence can and should be excluded.298  Furthermore, Rule 403 
requires the exclusion of evidence that, although relevant, might 
cause unfair prejudice or mislead the jury.299  Evidence that is not 
relevant to the legal claims or defenses in the actual case must be ex-
cluded.300  Statements that are offered only to try to sway the jury 
without any bearing on the issues before the court are not admissi-
ble.301  This underscores the previously described key difference be-
tween the professions: the arbiters of legal truth (courts) are con-
strained to drawing inferences about the past only from evidence that 
is relevant to the cases and controversies that are properly before the 
tribunal.302  Historians, on the other hand, are even less constrained 
in this regard: they can construct their narratives of the past from 
whatever information is available, even if unrelated to a specific in-
quiry. 
 294 Farber, supra note 20, at 1013 
 295 FED. R. EVID. art. IV (“Relevancy and its Limits”). 
 296 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 297 FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing that relevant evidence is admissible except where 
prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or other law). 
 298 See id. 
 299 FED. R. EVID. 403.  The rule requires a balancing to determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of un-
due delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”  Id. 
 300 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
 301 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 302 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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Returning to the church-state context as an example, imagine 
that a party offers at trial as an assertion of purported historical fact a 
statement that “the Founding Fathers intended America to be a 
Christian nation.”303  If the judge scrutinized the proposition under 
Rule 401, she would have to determine whether it related in any way 
to a fact central to the proponent’s case.  That determination would 
depend on the parameters of the legal issues properly before the 
court.  If the proponent of the evidence was suing over the denial on 
environmental grounds of a zoning variance for church construction, 
it might be unlikely that the assertion (based on a fact-specific in-
quiry, of course) would have any relevance, and therefore it could be 
excluded under Rule 702.304  If, instead, the proponent was suing for 
an injunction to prevent the removal of the Ten Commandments 
from the local courthouse, then the assertion might indeed be 
deemed relevant (whether or not it is in fact true) and admitted into 
evidence.305  Admissibility of evidence, of course, does not mean that 
the court will ultimately accept it as true—it means only that the 
court may consider it.  The court can hear testimony on historical 
evidence that it ultimately decides is not credible, not reliable, or not 
pertinent to the issues before it.  Even if the court decides to hear the 
testimony asserting “the United States is a Christian nation,” it can 
later decide that the assertion was not persuasive, was false, or was 
disproved by competing evidence. 
In other words, the judge or jury may treat historical evidence 
just like evidence proffered from any other cognate field.  I believe 
that rather than exclude history from the courtroom out of a fear 
that lawyers, judges, and jurors lack scholarly expertise in that field, 
we should prefer a world in which competing historical interpreta-
tions may be aired and then sorted out by the court’s gatekeeping 
function for relevance, admissibility, credibility, and persuasiveness 
under the law of evidence. 
2. Historians as Expert Witnesses for the Parties 
At the crux of the debate over incorporating standards of exper-
tise in history is the assumption that professional historians possess, 
 303 A different example of a historically debatable proposition would be that the 
founders intended to create a “wall of separation”; however, this metaphor has been 
constitutionalized, according to Kelly, by the law office history of Justice Black.  See 
Kelly, supra note 2. 
 304 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 305 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Or-
den v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
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and are guardians of, the locus of expertise in interpreting history.  
And in their role as guardians of expertise, it can be argued, histori-
ans seek to assert authority over the production of historical knowl-
edge.  Another interesting section of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
pertaining to historical evidence is the series of rules governing opin-
ions and expert testimony.  Rule 702 allows expert witnesses, pro-
vided that minimum standards of reliability are met: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact 
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based on sufficient 
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable princi-
ples and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.306
There is a trend in the courts toward the regular use of expert wit-
nesses.307  The evidentiary rule for expert testimony can easily be ap-
plied to professional historians.  The application of Rule 702 to histo-
rian expert witnesses, unfortunately, has been nearly ignored in the 
debates over history in law.308  While this will not help constrain ran-
dom sweeping historical generalizations of the sort described above, 
it can provide a means by which the professional standards of aca-
demic historians can be accounted for when using history in the 
courtroom. 
When, for example, a party offers a witness claiming to be an 
“expert” in religious history to testify on the historical practice of 
posting the Ten Commandments in public buildings, the court can 
inquire into that witness’s qualifications.309  If she holds a doctorate in 
religious history and serves on the faculty of a history department 
teaching religious history or serves on the faculty of a divinity school, 
she will likely qualify as an expert witness by training, and then the 
court will have to scrutinize the sufficiency of the chain of inferences 
in her testimony.  If she is a historian by profession, but working in a 
different field and without expertise in religious or constitutional his-
tory, the court will have to make a judgment call based on the judge’s 
determination of whether the proffered expert is qualified and 
 306 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 307 Farber, supra note 20, at 1013. 
 308 But see Martin, supra note 7. 
 309 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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whether her testimony will be helpful in determining the outcome of 
the case.310
If the purported expert in religious history is not an academic 
but is a local minister, or an avocational church historian, he may not 
qualify based on academic training alone.  But he may qualify, in-
deed, if the subject of his testimony—say, the particular church his-
tory of the county or region—is deemed within the realm of his ex-
pertise through experience and if that expertise relates to the issues 
presented in the case.  For example, in the case of a denial of a zon-
ing permit challenged under the Religious Land Use and Institution-
alized Persons Act,311 the court may determine that the particular lo-
cal church history is relevant to determining the historical pattern of 
land use or the motives behind the zoning decision.  Thus, Rule 702 
allows courts to weigh and evaluate the claims to be made by histori-
ans by inquiring into their professional expertise and credentials.  In 
other words, questions of law take into account the standards of the 
historical profession. 
The reason the Rule incorporates a high degree of flexibility, 
and does not set forth any specific criteria for what confers “expert” 
status, is that the courts—and the legal system—are not thought fit or 
competent to prescribe such standards or to make rulings on the 
norms and rules that are wholly internal to other disciplines, such as 
science and history.  The structure of American evidence law recog-
nizes that it is not the province of the courts to pass legally binding 
judgment on the standards of other professions, but rather only to 
make rulings based on the evidence relevant to the specific cases and 
controversies before them.312  The structure of the judicial system 
serves only to allow litigants advocating alternative explanations to of-
fer experts to comment on the cases and offer authority to persuade 
the courts.  The decision lies with the court on how to judge the pur-
ported expert’s credentials, knowledge, and credibility—just like with 
any other witness—and on whether or not to ultimately find the ex-
pert’s testimony persuasive.  Because of this flexibility, the courts are 
equipped to evaluate experts’ opinions on competing truth claims 
while remaining above the fray on disciplinary border controver-
sies.313
 310 FED. R. EVID. 703. 
 311 Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 312 U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 313 Kalman, supra note 44. 
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The rules governing expert testimony allow historians to exer-
cise the influence over legal questions appealing to history which 
some feel is necessary.  But does this mean the only way to appeal to 
professional history is by producing a historian in the courtroom?  
Must Jack Rakove or Gordon Wood get haled into court every time 
there is a question of historical interpretation?  Of course not.  Mel-
ton provides an effective outline for how lawyers can appeal to pro-
fessional historiography in briefs and arguments.314  Judges can evalu-
ate these claims as to their probative value as well when deciding the 
case.  Often, however, historians do play a direct role in actual litiga-
tion, such as in Brown v. Board of Education,315 or in similar situations 
such as in testifying before Congress, or even in occasional events 
such as “truth commissions.”316
The problematic part of historians serving as expert witnesses 
derives from the advocacy-versus-objectivity issue.  When historians 
are called as expert witnesses, however, it is generally because they 
are called by one of the parties to the actual litigation.317  As with ex-
pert witnesses from other fields, historians can then become entan-
gled in a battle of experts.  A historian, like other experts, can be in-
fluenced by external or internal pressures to offer testimony that 
favors the side that hired him.318  This can cast doubt on the ability of 
a historian expert witness—retained by one of the advocates, who has 
a particular historical interpretation redounding in its favor—to ren-
der neutral, objective historical testimony.  Courts and scholars must 
therefore be aware of such influences and can especially profit from 
analyzing competing historical explanations offered by the advo-
cates—or by scholars with differing views—to advance their compet-
ing theories of history, in order for the court (or, by analogy, the lar-
ger scholarly community) to weigh the different interpretations and 
find the version that is most persuasive as the one approximating his-
torical truth. 
3. Court-Appointed Expert Historians 
A similar aspect of the critique is the charge that even when ac-
tual historians are consulted and relied on as experts, their testimony 
 314 Melton, supra note 4. 
 315 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 316 See generally Charles S. Maier, Doing History, Doing Justice: The Narrative of the His-
torian and of the Truth Commission, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH 
COMMISSIONS 261 (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 317 Martin, supra note 7, at 1536. 
 318 Farber, supra note 20, at 1011. 
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and historical interpretations should be viewed skeptically when given 
in the service of a party in interest because their expert testimony for 
a party may blur the line between advocacy and objectivity.  But what 
if historical experts were not offered by the parties, but rather ap-
pointed by the courts?  One final example from the Federal Rules 
worth discussing in this regard is Rule 706, which allows the court to 
appoint an expert witness for the court on its own initiative.319  The 
judge has discretion to consult the expertise of a professional histo-
rian to resolve a difficult or indeterminate question of historical in-
terpretation.  The question Rule 706 raises for our purposes is 
whether to favor the use of expert historians offered by the adversar-
ial parties or to prefer instead historians appointed as experts by the 
decision-making court. 
This scenario highlights perfectly the issues presented by using 
history in law: the question of advocacy versus objectivity in historical 
interpretation, and the intraprofessional contest concerning jurisdic-
tion over historical knowledge.  Having the courts, rather than the 
parties, appoint historians as expert witnesses would seem to have 
many advantages.  Most obviously, it would seem to mitigate some of 
the concern that the expert would feel pressured to offer historical 
testimony that favored the position of the party that retained him.320  
Instead, it would seem, a historian appointed by the court would have 
no pressure other than to offer an objective historical interpretation 
to assist the judge and jury.321  In other words, using Rule 706 or its 
state-law analogues would seem to place the historian within the am-
bit of the court’s role as the objective truth-seeker in the adversarial 
process. 
But there are other concerns with expert historical testimony 
that Rule 706 will not solve.  These concerns are chiefly those that 
would be imported from the historical profession itself.  First is the 
question whether historians or historiography can truly be objec-
tive.322  While the objectivity question has been prone to being over-
stated as a controversy,323 it nonetheless casts doubt on the notion of 
 319 FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 320 Farber, supra note 20, at 1011–12. 
 321 Martin, supra note 7, at 1544–46. 
 322 NOVICK, supra note 8, at 7 (likening the pursuit of objectivity to “nailing jelly to 
the wall”). 
 323 Schiller, supra note 207, at 1170 (“[F]inding a genuinely ‘subjectivist historian’ 
is rather like searching for a unicorn. . . .  I have yet to meet a historian who claimed 
that his scholarship was nothing more than fiction or that his ‘version’ of the events 
he studied was not an attempt to ascertain the truth.  The historical profession is, at 
its core, profoundly committed to a search for truth about the past.”).
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court-appointed historians as a panacea.  The point of having a court-
appointed expert would be to place the expert in a position to render 
the most objective testimony possible based on her expertise.  If his-
torians themselves question whether historical objectivity is possible, 
this rationale becomes suspect.  Even if a historian is not working for 
one party or the other, his testimony may nonetheless reflect any pre-
sumptions or biases that inform his own historical work.324  At an even 
more basic level, the fact that (as in any scholarly discipline) histori-
ans disagree with one another, belong to different schools of inter-
pretation, and apply different methodologies to their work, under-
mines the notion that any one historian might be able to step into the 
courtroom and render expertise that speaks for the entire historical 
profession. 
A related problem with court-appointed historians is that the tes-
timony of a professional historian—as with that of other non-
scientific experts—is based on the expert’s apparent professional au-
thority, signaled through credentialed expertise, rather than on rea-
son or empirical method.  A court-appointed historian, unchal-
lenged, might appear to the jury and judge as offering an 
undisputable interpretation of history based on the expert’s author-
ity, and not necessarily from the substantive correctness of his inter-
pretation.  Granted, the persuasiveness of non-scientific expert wit-
nesses in general can depend more on authority than on 
demonstrable, empirical methodologies.325  But the court-appointed 
historian might not be challenged by the presentation of evidence 
that might provide contravening or alternative explanations.  Even if 
challenged by an expert offered by one of the parties, the court-
appointed historian would enjoy a tremendous advantage in credibil-
ity simply from the perception that he works “neutrally” for the judge.  
Thus, the expert’s cloak of authority might obscure the fact that 
there may be real controversies in the field, or that the expert’s in-
terpretation is tendentious or only one of several acceptable or plau-
sible explanations of the past.  Any foray into the literature on the 
historical profession, as well as common sense observations of the 
controversies over the public meaning of history, will reveal that his-
tory is highly contested and its meaning is ever evolving, both in the 
public discourse as well as within the scholarly discipline.326  But a 
 324 HOFFER, supra note 141, at 126–27. 
 325 See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 326 NOVICK, supra note 8, at 1, 6 (alluding to the work of philosopher W.B. Gallie 
in calling objectivity an “essentially contested concept”). 
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court’s reliance on a single, authoritative expert to explain history 
might fail to account for history’s complexity. 
The appointment of a seemingly neutral historian would seem to 
assuage the fear that a historian-for-hire might tend to offer testi-
mony favorable to the party that retained her.327  But there is also the 
problem that having a single historian appointed by the court could 
tend to limit the scope of possible interpretations that would be of-
fered.  As Peter Hoffer amply shows, the historical profession itself is 
prone to a degree of ideological conformity, not only in its members’ 
policy views, but in the practice of the scholarly discipline itself, in the 
predominant methodologies used, and even in the choice of subject 
matter to be studied (for example, “new history” and bottom-up so-
cial history have for a generation predominated over now-
unfashionable political, diplomatic, or military history).328
Thus, if a court were exposed to only the interpretation of one 
historian, her interpretation would likely be one that is constrained 
by the currently leading paradigms of the historical profession.329  A 
wider range of possible historical explanations would be excluded.  
An interpretation that is a minority view but is nonetheless plausible 
according to academic history standards might well be persuasive to 
the court.  Conversely, if the court-appointed historian represented a 
minority view among historians on a certain issue, the court might 
never be made aware of the existence of the majority view.  And it is 
the adversarial parties who are best equipped to scan the range of 
professional views and present such competing explanations to the 
court for its consideration.330  Indeed, there are even history litigation 
consultants available to assist lawyers in finding the best historical ex-
 327 This common critique of expert witnesses fails to contemplate that the expert 
might feel countervailing pressure to avoid censure from her academic colleagues, as 
happened in the controversy over the historians’ expert testimony in the famous 
Sears gender discrimination case.  See Thomas Haskell & Sanford Levinson, Academic 
Freedom and Expert Wtinessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1988);   
 328 See HOFFER, supra note 141, at 62–85; AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON 
THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE (John F. Marszalek & Wilson D. Miscamble eds., 1997). 
 329 Of course, there is a certain advantage to knowing that an expert’s opinion is 
consonant with the majority opinion in the discipline of expertise.  But this notion, 
which had been incorporated in the regime under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 
(D.C. Cir. 1923), was rejected in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993), for the less restrictive test that allowed for the testimony of experts, even if 
not within the “majority” opinion, as long as their opinion is scientifically reliable.  
Kumho Tire extended this to nonscientific expert testimony.  Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 
137. 
 330 Schiller, supra note 207, at 1176. 
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pertise and research in preparation of their cases.331  By allowing both 
sides to proffer expert historical testimony in their support, the use of 
expert witnesses from “adversarial” perspectives gives the judge and 
jury the opportunity to hear different views of historical facts and in-
terpretation, rather than to hear only one version of history. 
Perhaps the best practice to follow for courts contemplating his-
tory, then, would be to use court-appointed historians where the 
judge deems it appropriate, but in conjunction with historical experts 
offered by the parties.  This would allow for a range of interpretations 
to be available but would also give the court a nonpartisan voice to 
consider for comparison.  While the arguments of those who call for 
the exclusive use of court-appointed historians under Rule 706 have 
considerable force, a careful study of the professional standards of 
both law and history as undertaken in this Article cautions against 
overreliance on any one point of view, no matter how seemingly au-
thoritative. 
Methodologically, the desirability of adversarial expert historical 
testimony in addition to court-appointed historians does not mean 
that we should have to countenance “junk” history that is unsound.  
The rules of evidence, if used wisely, equip the court and the parties 
with the tools to prevent the airing of junk history in the courtroom.  
Careful attention to vetting the parties’ historians under the Supreme 
Court’s framework for evaluating nonscientific experts set forth in 
Kumho Tire can help mitigate, if not totally obviate, the risk of junk 
history (and as the history scandals show, even the most highly-
regarded professional historiography can nonetheless be based on 
“junk” methodology or evidence). 
Greater attention to historical method on the part of judges and 
lawyers, of course, will help enforce higher scrutiny for ensuring that 
expert historians—even adversarial ones—still meet minimum stan-
dards of qualification, admissibility, and reliability.332  Judges can 
evaluate and incorporate professional standards for ruling on expert 
historians’ qualifications and on the relevance, admissibility, and per-
suasiveness of historical evidence.333  Advocates can increase their so-
phistication in offering, challenging, and cross-examining profes-
sional historians.334  Unqualified historians can be challenged under 
 331 See, e.g., The History Associates, Inc., http://www.historyassociates.com (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
 332 Melton, supra note 4. 
 333 Id. 
 334 Id. 
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the standards of Rule 702,335 and tendentious testimony can be un-
dermined on the merits.336  Despite critics’ legitimate concerns about 
using history in law, a greater awareness of the applicability of tradi-
tional evidence law to historical evidence is probably the best ap-
proach towards ensuring that when lawyers do history, they do so re-
sponsibly. 
* * * 
As acknowledged above, the evidentiary rules will apply only in 
the small percentage of cases on courts’ dockets where historical 
claims are made.  Many instances where litigants make appeals to his-
tory consist of broad assertions during argument, and these are often 
more for anecdotal and persuasive effect than for proving a specific 
element of any claim or defense.  Because of this, however, it is in a 
sense easier to reconcile the alleged problem of the seeming cross-
purposes of law and history in evaluating and using evidence.  Law-
yers appealing to history for the purpose of argument are subject 
both to rules of professional conduct that require a modicum of hon-
esty and, more importantly, to rules of evidence that allow the judge 
and jury to evaluate the relevance, credibility, and persuasiveness of 
the claim in assessing truth.  The rules of evidence give the court the 
flexibility to consider—but not the duty to adopt—the claims of any 
expert proferred as an authoritative source on historical matters.  
The operation of both advocacy and objectivity in the courtroom is 
merely an assignment of roles.  The ultimate purpose of the Ameri-
can judicial system is, similar to the historical profession (and how-
ever imperfect), to ascertain an operative understanding of the truth. 
4. Are Historians Any Different from Other Experts? 
I believe this inquiry is worth further study, and not simply be-
cause of the scope of its potential impact.  The reason this previously 
unexplored application of the debate over history and law is so com-
pelling is that Judge Posner and other critics who castigate courts for 
using history seem to charge that because neither lawyers nor judges 
are “qualified to resolve historical disputes” they should not entertain 
them at all.337   Along those same lines, however, it could just as accu-
rately be said that neither are judges qualified to act as forensic scien-
tists, psychologists, environmental chemists, land-use planners, soci-
ologists, engineers, or experts in any of the other areas of 
 335 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 336 Schiller, supra note 207. 
 337 See generally Posner, supra note 1. 
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professional expertise of which courts nonetheless regularly avail 
themselves, all mediated through the law of evidence.  Yet no one 
claims that these experts should be barred categorically from the 
courthouse door because judges are not certified or up to speed with 
those experts’ internal professional standards in forensic science, 
psychology, and other disciplines. 
It is safe to say that most judges are not scientifically competent 
personally to perform the forensic laboratory testing to determine to 
a degree of scientific certainty the identity of a criminal or the inno-
cence of a death-row inmate based on DNA analysis lifted from a 
twenty-year-old cigarette butt.338  Yet we do not expect our judges to 
be so trained, nor do we bar such evidence from consideration 
merely for the courts’ lack of scientific expertise.  Courts have to de-
cide cases and controversies that involve questions from many profes-
sional areas in which the judge may not be a trained expert.  There is 
no reason courts should be deemed qualified to make decisions 
based on expert scientific evidence, presented to the court according 
to generally acceptable professional standards,339 but then categori-
cally prohibited from entertaining similar disputes regarding histori-
cal interpretations.340  In fact, the Kumho Tire doctrine explicitly con-
templates nonscientific expert evidence, and historical evidence falls 
rather easily into this framework.  If we step back from the law-and-
history context and think of history simply as one of many cognate 
fields that can be brought to bear on legal questions, we might be less 
concerned as long as generally-applicable evidence law is complied 
with.  None of this is meant to imply, of course, that the law is not 
rocket science. 
D. Evidence Law and History in Legal Scholarship 
This Article has sought to address general critiques of the use of 
history in law by examining the phenomenon both in legal scholar-
ship and in litigation.  I started this analysis by examining the uses of 
history by legal scholars of different ideological persuasions341 and 
then compared the scholarly issues to using history in the courtroom 
 338 See Andrew P. Thomas, The CSI Effect: Fact or Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 
70 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/2006/02/thomas.html (discussing the 
“CSI Effect,” where prosecutors have argued that juries have higher expectations for 
the level of scientific proof in a case because of popular television shows such as the 
forensic investigator program CSI).   
 339 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 340 Nor are courts in fact so constrained, according to the Supreme Court’s Kumho 
Tire doctrine.  Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149–150 (1999). 
 341 See supra Part II. 
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through the prism of evidence law.342  Now let us bring the analogy 
back to academia.  The foregoing has shown that the application of 
evidence law to historical arguments in actual cases and controversies 
makes sense, in part because the rules of evidence, by definition, gov-
ern the litigation process.  My argument is that using evidentiary rules 
and standards rigorously to evaluate historical claims in the court-
room is an idea that has been underemphasized in both theory and 
practice and can to some degree assuage concerns about parties’ of-
fering competing versions of the past to persuade the decision-
makers in the court system.   
The remaining question to address, then, is how this might apply 
to legal scholarship, where scholars are not bound per se by the rules 
of evidence.  It is essentially a matter of encouraging individual 
scholars to incorporate the ideals and the norms of evidence law 
when engaging in what would be considered historical analysis.  The 
law of evidence that applies to historical arguments (as well as to 
those involving any other area of professional subject-matter exper-
tise) provides a mechanism to ensure that historical evidence, when 
offered by a party to a controversy, will be relevant and reliable.  This 
principle can be a guideline for legal scholars investigating the mean-
ings of the past.  Legal scholars should take care to ensure that their 
historical evidence is relevant, reliable, contextually appropriate, and 
faithful to the historical record. 
For legal scholars, using evidence law as a framework to guide 
historical analysis in law is, like nearly all academic canons, largely a 
matter of self-regulation.  To the extent that this serves as an exhorta-
tory guideline, I contend that it is nevertheless one that can be both 
effective and reasonably feasible in practice.  Indeed, I believe it 
would be much easier to ask legal scholars to think in terms of evi-
dence law than it would be to try to instill grounding in the discipli-
nary norms and methodologies of the historical profession, whose 
members spend years cultivating the expertise that applies to their 
work.  Many legal scholars who need to analyze historical evidence or 
arguments might more easily be able to think in terms of evidence 
law than historical method, and I believe that we would end up with 
“better” lawyers’ histories as a result. 
In the area of scholarship, the argument that a rigorous applica-
tion of evidence law could lessen our concern over the fact that advo-
cates may offer competing historical accounts in the litigation context 
is applicable at the broadest, systemic level.  Evidence law provides 
 342 See supra Part V. 
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that a neutral, “objective” arbiter—the court, comprised of judge and 
jury—will evaluate all of the proffered historical evidence and assess 
its credibility and persuasiveness in rendering the court’s interpreta-
tion of the past.  Analogizing the court’s role in litigation to that of 
the broader scholarly academic community—including both legal 
scholars and historians—in judging the accuracy and persuasiveness 
of various interpretations, we can understand that historical argu-
ments can make valuable contributions to understanding the law 
without necessarily sacrificing all disciplinary safeguards. 
I must emphasize that I do not contend that it is permissible for 
legal scholars to shape their historical arguments in the light most fa-
vorable to their ultimate position on an issue.  An academic thesis is 
most emphatically not a scholar’s “client.”  We still may (as we usually 
do) end up with astoundingly different historical accounts from dif-
ferent legal scholars.  However, this is not necessarily a bad thing.  
Just as the judge and jury evaluate historical arguments according to 
the law of evidence, the larger scholarly community can evaluate dif-
ferent claims and interpretations, offer competing hypotheses, syn-
thesize various approaches, and move toward consensus or continue 
to debate legitimate differences.  Thinking in terms of evidence law 
will help ensure that regardless of whether legal scholars disagree 
over history, the arguments offered will be evaluated for their reliabil-
ity and their relevance to the legal issues at hand.  Historians, fur-
thermore, can contribute to this process. 
As with subject-matter expert testimony in court, the possibility 
of competing scholarly accounts of the past does not mean that we 
must excise categorically all forms of historical evidence deployed in 
support of legal arguments simply because of the professional status 
or credentials of the interpreter.  Professional historians may indeed 
be best equipped in the abstract to study and interpret history.  But 
lawyers by nature must work with information from many different 
fields, ranging from the hard sciences and technology, to economics 
and social science, to culture and history.  Because resolving ques-
tions about the past is central to the study and practice of the law, ad-
vocates and legal scholars necessarily will have to look to history at 
times.  And, as Goldsmith and Vermeule point out, legal academic 
arguments can be examined, discussed, and aired out in the broader 
academic discourse.343  Indeed, because of the nature of legal scholar-
ship, with literally hundreds of academic journals engaging in con-
tinuous debate over the meaning of the law, it may even be more 
 343 Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 172, at 156. 
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likely in law than in other academic disciplines that poorly-done his-
tory will be exposed, discussed, and repudiated. 
We still rely on individual scholars to behave ethically and to 
avoid offering false, fabricated, or tendentious historical evidence in 
support of a given position.  But evidence law principles show that 
there can be some degree of systemic review for historical arguments 
made at law.344  At a minimum, the risks inherent in allowing mem-
bers of the legal profession to engage in serious historical inquiry are 
outweighed by the benefits gained from using history to inform the 
law.  In a sense, asking scholars to evaluate historical arguments ac-
cording to the standards of evidence law is no different from applying 
professional norms and ethics to scholarship in any other area of le-
gal scholarship.  And these norms are, of course, already practiced 
widely.  A simple matter of increasing the consciousness of the stan-
dards of evidence when working with history will likely have a salutary 
effect. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While the normative debates over the issue are interesting and 
useful, the use of history by lawyers, judges, and legal scholars is on 
the rise and shows no signs of going away.  The law is intimately en-
twined with history, and the current dominance of historical interpre-
tations in legal interpretation and in public debates about law under-
scores our collective need to look to the past to explain our current 
law and politics.  The sociology of the professions shows how this 
trend poses challenges to traditional disciplinary jurisdictions over 
production and evolution of historical and legal knowledge.  The 
canons of objectivity and advocacy seem to posit an additional prob-
lem for using history in law.  In practice the law of evidence allows us 
to account for differing professional standards and offers us a worka-
ble, if imperfect, system for responsibly evaluating historical evidence 
offered by the parties or by expert witnesses. 
The best practice for courts would be to use court-appointed his-
torical experts in addition to—but not to the exclusion of—those 
proffered by the parties.  Additionally, lawyers and judges (as well as 
legal scholars) who give due attention to historians’ methods will 
have a substantial advantage in offering, countering, analyzing, or 
evaluating historical evidence.  If we invite historians to “scold the law 
scholars for doing law-office history, for ‘getting it wrong,’ ironing 
out context and discontinuity to muster the past into present ser-
 344 See Martin, supra note 7; supra Part V.C. 
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vice,”345 we will end up with better and more accurate history in the 
law.  Legal scholars should strive to understand and adhere to histo-
rians’ professional norms when doing historical analysis.  Legal advo-
cates should be aware of the historians’ standards in making their his-
torical arguments both ethically and effectively, yet adhere vigorously 
to the law of evidence in crafting legal arguments.  And courts should 
know these standards and apply them rigorously under the rules of 
evidence to evaluate historical claims. 
Perhaps the best approach for courts and for scholars is an im-
perfect, but workable, muddling through.  I believe that looking to 
history to interpret and understand the meanings of law is both valu-
able and necessary.  And I believe that there is indeed hope that we 
can promote the reasonable, reliable application of history to law.  
Regardless, we must recognize the reality: from the Supreme Court 
on down, and throughout the legal academy, many in the legal pro-
fession are “doing history” and will continue to do so.  We should 
therefore be engaged across disciplines and with the public so that 
the undertaking of historical study can be done as competently and 
in as fully informed a manner as possible.  Scholars and practitioners 
from both professions should continue their methodological dia-
logue and try to suggest and evaluate other ways in which we can bet-
ter accommodate professional standards when history is applied to 
law. 
 
 345 Forbath, supra note 103, at 1917. 
